SMAD PickleBot · Post-mortems

SMAD PickleBot Post Mortems

Every production outage that reached players or money, newest first. 16 so far.

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SMAD PickleBot · Post-mortem · none. Snow White found it at 10:39 AM PT while reading the inbox's watch code for #972; nothing alerted.

Post Mortem: 11/5/26 Payment and Club Emails Stopped Pushing When the Play Console Watch Replaced the Inbox's Gmail Watch

The league's inbox tells the bot about three kinds of email the moment they arrive: Venmo payments, Zelle payments, and the Athenaeum's court reservation emails. Gmail does this with a "watch" on the inbox that publishes a message to Google Cloud whenever mail lands under the labels it names. On the morning of 11/5/26 a new listener, the Play Console Watch, started a watch of its own on the same inbox, for Google Play's review emails. Gmail keeps only one watch per mailbox, so the new one silently replaced the old one. For 95 minutes, payment and club emails reached nobody by push.

Outage
1 h 35 min
Failed
11/5/26 09:05
Detected
11/5/26 10:39
Fix pushed
11/5/26 10:57
Restored
11/5/26 10:40

Summary

One Gmail watch on the league's inbox publishes to the Pub/Sub topic venmo-payment-emails, and the Venmo trigger (Cloud Run service venmo-sync-trigger) runs the payment sync on each push. Since #853 (11/3/26) the same watch also carries the club's "Athenaeum Courts" label, so a court booked or cancelled by hand reaches its game at once. The daily run renews that watch every other day (setup-gmail-watch.py --renew).

On 11/4/26 the Play Console Watch was built (#967): Google Play sends no webhook when a review ends, so the watch reads Play Console's review emails instead. It started its own Gmail watch, on the same inbox, with only the "Google Play Console" label and its own topic play-console-events, renewed by the hourly clock. It shipped in the 7:21 AM PT release (change order #974).

Gmail allows one watch per mailbox: a second watch call replaces the first without an error. At 9:05:10 AM PT the Play Console Watch's first renewal did exactly that. From then on Gmail pushed only Play Console's mail, and Venmo, Zelle and club emails reached no listener.

Snow White found it at 10:39 AM PT while starting #972 (moving the payment watch onto the shared kit), confirmed it from the inbox and the logs, and restored the payment watch by hand at 10:40 AM PT. That restore's first push caught up the club emails that had waited. The permanent fix, one watch for every listener, shipped at 10:57 AM PT and was confirmed at 11:01 AM PT when one push reached both listeners. Outage: 1 hour 35 minutes. No payment was missed, and no game was changed by the delay.

Impact

Timeline (PT)

WhenWhat
11/3/26The club's reservation emails ride the inbox's payment watch (⚪#853); its code notes that Gmail allows one watch a mailbox
11/5/26 1:20 AMThe Play Console Watch's Gmail push is built on its own watch and topic: 5775f439 "The Google Play cards show a release in Google's review, then its approval, woken by our own sends and Google's email, with no polling" (#967, Black Widow)
11/5/26 7:21 AMChange order #974 (2a18ae1a) ships it, Snow White the release captain
11/5/26 8:25 AMThe Venmo trigger's last Gmail push before the outage
11/5/26 9:05:10 AMThe Play Console Watch's first renewal ("Gmail push renewed") replaces the inbox's watch with Play's label alone
11/5/26 9:05–9:07 AMFive club emails for the North court arrive; no push reaches the Venmo trigger
11/5/26 10:38 AMSnow White starts #972 and reads both watches' code: two watches on one mailbox
11/5/26 10:39 AMDetected: the Venmo trigger's last push was 8:25, and the inbox shows the five club emails after 9:05 with no push
11/5/26 10:40:14 AMRestored: the payment watch renewed by hand (setup-gmail-watch.py --renew); its first push at 10:40:21 reads the club's reservations again
11/5/26 10:52 AMThe one-watch fix committed: 89be17ce "The inbox keeps one Gmail watch for payments, the club and Play Console, so no watch replaces another"
11/5/26 10:57 AMChange order #1001 ships it (a RELEASE_FIX push, on Gene's 10:55 AM "sounds good - ship it")
11/5/26 11:00:58 AMThe inbox's one watch set with all four labels, from the shipped code
11/5/26 11:01 AMOne Gmail push reaches the Play Console Watch (19:01:01Z) and the Venmo trigger (19:01:04Z): both listeners confirmed

Why it happened

The technical reason. Gmail keeps one watch per mailbox, and a new watch call replaces the old one without an error. The Play Console Watch was built as a separate listener with its own topic and its own watch, so its first renewal took the inbox's watch away from the Venmo trigger. Nothing in either service noticed: Gmail's answer was a success, and a listener that stops receiving pushes has nothing to log.

Why it shipped. The rule was known and written down: the club check's own code says "Gmail allows one watch a mailbox, so the payment watch carries the club's label too" (#853, two days earlier). But nothing enforced it. There was no one place that defined the inbox's watch, no test that two pieces of code could not each start one, and the Play watch's tests used a fake Gmail that has no notion of one watch replacing another. The release's smokes checked that each service answered, not that the inbox still pushed payments.

Why nobody knew for 95 minutes. A watch that stops pushing is silent. No ERROR, no dead letter and no failed run: the Venmo trigger simply got no calls. Payment emails are rare enough that an hour without one is normal, so nothing looked wrong until someone read the code.

Who did what

What it cost

Google Cloud: nothing measurable. Claude: not measured; the fix ran in one long session beside other work.

Action items

ItemTicketFix
The inbox keeps one Gmail watch, every listener's label on it, defined in one place (picklebot_core/inbox_watch.py); a test refuses any watch call that does not take its labels from there⚪#972Done live 10:57 AM PT, 89be17ce
The labels' Gmail filters are declared in infra/gmail/filters.json and applied by the kit⚪#972Done 89be17ce
?renew=force on the Play Console Watch renews (found verifying: it answered a plain look)⚪#1004Built, on dock: de5fe16e
A Gmail watch that stops pushing a listener's mail is an alert within the hour⚪#1006Open
The watch's topic is named for every listener, gmail-inbox-watch, and the Venmo trigger moves off its Eventarc trigger⚪#1000Open
ChuangFinance's finance watch on the same kit module⚪#999Open

Written by Snow White on 11/5/26 PT at Gene's request, from Cloud Logging, the inbox's own message list (labels and times only), the git history and the tickets. Every timestamp is observed, none estimated. Commits are named by their subject line and linked.

Incident record: ops/incidents.json → 2026-11-05-play-watch-replaced-payment-watch

Shareable page: https://smadpicklebot.com/postmortems#pm-2026-11-05-play-watch-replaced-payment-watch

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SMAD PickleBot · Post-mortem · issue #698 (Gene's report; the dead-letter alert had told him both mornings in words that did not say what broke)

Post Mortem: 10/31/26 Next Week's Games Not Published Because the Desktop Vote-Writer Could Not Start the 8 AM Run's Jobs

Saturday is SMAD's poll day: at 8 AM the bot adds next week's games to the database, where the app's Games tab shows them, and posts them to the SMAD Pickleball group with the Games tab's link. On Saturday 10/31/26 neither happened. The morning before, Friday 10/30/26, the same run had already lost its court refresh, its Venmo sync and its balance DMs. The technical cause was one missing setting: since 10/29/26 the bot's event worker had been running on the desktop instead of in the cloud, and there it was not allowed to start the Cloud Run jobs that do most of the 8 AM run's work. The strategic cause, in Gene's words, is that the vote-writer "has become bloatware to do too many unrelated things": when it moved to the desktop for its CPU-heavy work, the whole 8 AM run went with it.

Outage
34 h 21 min
Failed
10/30/26 08:00
Detected
10/31/26 18:04
Fix pushed
10/31/26 18:10
Restored
10/31/26 18:21

Summary

The 8 AM run is a chain of steps on the event bus. Since 10/23/26 one daily.started event fans out into a daily.step_requested per step, and the bot's event worker, the vote-writer, takes every one of them: it runs the light steps itself and starts a Cloud Run job for each heavy one (the court refresh, the poll, the Venmo sync, the Top 5 and others run on smad-commands or smad-payment-sweep). The vote-writer is also the worker for members' votes, matches, cancels and Post Game, all on one Pub/Sub subscription, bot-reactions.

On 10/29/26 that subscription moved to the desktop (#575): the desktop pulls it and runs the vote-writer's own image in Docker, with a dead man's switch that hands it back to the cloud if the desktop stops. The aim was the CPU-heavy reactions. But a job start is refused anywhere that is not Cloud Run unless a setting says otherwise (picklebot_core/cloud_run_jobs.start, a guard so a test or a laptop can never start a production job), and the desktop's container did not carry that setting. Every 8 AM job step was refused, sent back to Pub/Sub, refused again ten times, and dead-lettered. The steps waiting on the court refresh, the poll among them, were never asked for.

The refusal itself was a WARNING inside the container, whose output went to docker logs alone, so neither Cloud Logging nor Sentry saw it. The dead letters did raise an alert both mornings, and the alert mailer emailed and Slacked Gene at 8:12 AM PT, but in words that named only a queue: "an event was given up on by its consumer (events-dead-letter, ...)". It filed no GitHub issue, so no investigator was woken, and Cloud Monitoring closed it six minutes later.

Gene saw that the games were missing at 6:04 PM PT on 10/31/26 and told Black Widow, who found the cause and sent it to Snow White at 6:09 PM PT (#698). The container could start jobs again at 6:10 PM PT. On Gene's yes at 6:20 PM PT the poll-day chain ran once more: next week's three games were added and posted to the group at 6:21 PM PT. Outage: 34 hours 21 minutes from the first refused step, 10 hours 21 minutes for the poll-day post. No money was lost.

Impact

Timeline (PT)

WhenWhat
10/23/26 12:49 AMThe 8 AM run rides the event bus: its steps become the vote-writer's, the heavy ones as job starts (24d5c9fe, Snow White)
10/29/26 8:00 AMThe last 8 AM run on the cloud vote-writer: "refresh-courts started on smad-commands as smad-commands-l2ct4"
10/29/26 12:05 PMThe desktop takes the whole bot-reactions subscription, the cloud taking it back within a minute if the desktop stops beating (d4530eaa, #575, Snow White, on Gene's word of 11:21 to 11:40 AM PT). Its SIM test exercised votes and matches, no 8 AM step
10/30/26 8:00:04 AMFour steps requested: the court refresh, the Venmo sync, the Gmail watch and the booking profile. The desktop worker's log: "the container answered 500; nacked", 40 times by 8:01 AM
10/30/26 8:07 to 8:08 AMEach refused ten times, dead-lettered to events-dead-letter (Cloud Monitoring counts 4)
10/30/26 8:12:38 AMThe alert "An event was given up on by an API consumer (dead-lettered)" opens; at 8:12:42 AM the alert mailer emails and Slacks Gene "an event was given up on by its consumer (events-dead-letter, Fri 10/30/26 8:12 AM PT)". No GitHub issue
10/30/26 8:18:46 AMThe alert closes itself
10/31/26 8:00 AMThree steps requested and refused 30 times: the court refresh, the Venmo sync, the booking profile. The poll waits on the court refresh
10/31/26 8:08 AMDead-lettered (3); 8:13:58 AM the alert opens and Gene is told the same words; 8:19:29 AM it closes
10/31/26 6:04 PMGene to Black Widow: the Saturday 8 AM games never reached the Games tab, and no post went to the group
10/31/26 6:09 PMBlack Widow files #698 with the cause and sends it to Snow White
10/31/26 6:10 PMbot-reactions handed to the cloud vote-writer; the desktop's container gets SMAD_ALLOW_JOB_START=1 and the listener daemon restarts it (#587's supervisor, live that evening)
10/31/26 6:20 PMGene's yes to run the poll-day chain again: daily.started (poll only)
10/31/26 6:21:38 PMThe court refresh done; the poll step adds the three games and records the week
10/31/26 6:21:47 PMThe group post delivered, Games This Week a second later; 6:22:14 PM each game's jobs made
10/31/26 7:44 PMRelease b8d60c8f: the fix, the container's ERROR lines forwarded to Cloud Logging, and the refused start logged at ERROR (9d10973e)

Why it happened

The technical reason. The desktop's container ran the vote-writer's image with every one of its cloud settings except the three the job-start guard reads (K_SERVICE, CLOUD_RUN_JOB, SMAD_ALLOW_JOB_START), which Cloud Run sets on its own. The guard did what it was built for, refusing a production job start from a box that is not Cloud Run, on the one box where those starts were meant.

Why nobody knew for 34 hours. The refusal was logged at WARNING, a level for a retry, and only inside a container whose lines reached no one. The dead letters raised a real alert both mornings, but it named a queue, not the morning's work, so it read like the noise of a busy week, and it opened no ticket that would have woken the investigator. A bus step that never ran leaves nothing behind to notice: the steps after it simply wait.

Why it shipped. #575's test drove the reactions it was built for, votes and matches in a SIM game, and passed. No test or check listed what else rode bot-reactions, and the move took all of it.

The strategic reason (Gene's). The vote-writer collected work that has nothing to do with votes. It began as the vote queue's worker (10/5/26). The 8 AM run had been one job with every step in it; Gene traces that to its GitHub days, when each scheduled workflow cost money, so the schedules were combined into one 8 AM daily run. When that run moved to the event bus on 10/23/26, its steps were handed to the vote-writer as the one listener every event already reached. By 10/29/26 the subscription carried members' taps, cancels, Post Game, the member sync and the whole 8 AM run. Moving it to the desktop for the CPU-heavy part moved everything, onto a box built for one kind of work. Gene, 10/31/26 7:29 PM PT: "We should really only have the game plan and post game runner on local box, only CPU intensive runs should be done locally. Then we implement the existing ticket to remove daily scheduler and dynamically created scheduled runs and use an hourly event thrower instead."

Who did what

What it cost

Google Cloud: nothing measurable (70 refused deliveries and two short job runs). Claude: not measured. The rework ran in one long session beside other work, and its share was not separated from the transcript.

Action items

ItemTicketFix
The desktop's container may start the 8 AM run's jobs⚪#698Done live 6:10 PM PT, 9d10973e
The container's ERROR lines reach Cloud Logging and the alert mailer as the vote-writer's; a start refused this way is an ERROR⚪#698Done 9d10973e
The listener daemon keeps the desktop worker running and restarts it⚪#587Done b8875e1e
Only CPU-heavy work on the desktop: Post Game alone (the Game Plan's replans run inside the vote and match handlers, 2 s each, so they stay with the vote in the cloud); the 8 AM run's steps and every other reaction back to the cloud vote-writer⚪#706Built 11/1/26, on dock: the votes topic's votes-desktop subscription (Post Game) is the desktop's, votes-worker and bot-reactions the cloud's for good
An hourly event replaces the 8 AM scheduler and each game's scheduled jobs⚪#541Open Gene's next
A dead-lettered event alerts as what it was, the 8 AM run's step by name, and opens an issue that wakes the investigator⚪#707Open
The desktop worker follows each release's new vote-writer image (found during: it ran the old one until restarted)⚪#708Open
The vote reminder's own day, Sunday, about the coming week (found during: its weekend gate never let it go)⚪#703Done 75b7549c

Written by Snow White on 10/31/26 PT at Gene's request, from Cloud Logging, the desktop worker's own log, Firestore's step claims, the events dead-letter queue, Cloud Monitoring's alerts, PostHog, the git history and the tickets. Every timestamp is observed, none estimated. Commits are named by their subject line and linked.

Incident record: ops/incidents.json → 2026-10-31-desktop-worker-could-not-start-jobs

Shareable page: https://smadpicklebot.com/postmortems#pm-2026-10-31-desktop-worker-could-not-start-jobs

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SMAD PickleBot · Post-mortem · issue #334 (Gene's report; no alert fired)

Post Mortem: 10/25/26 New Members' Ratings and Matches Missing Because Players Were Keyed by Name

Two members who joined on 10/22/26 played their first games on 10/23/26, and their profiles then showed no SMAD DUPR rating, "0 matches" and no reliability score, for about 46 hours. Their rating rows had been filed under a different key than the one their profile looked them up by. The cause was not one bad push but a design choice from the API's first day: every player record was keyed by a slug made from the player's name, and a name is not stable.

Outage
45 h 48 min
Failed
10/23/26 22:08
Detected
10/25/26 18:12
Fix pushed
10/25/26 19:22
Restored
10/25/26 19:56

Summary

A player's slug is a short text key made from their name by one rule: lower case, every other character a hyphen ("Shyam Bhaskaran" becomes shyam-bhaskaran). On 10/5/26 the API made it the key of every player record: the roster row, and the player columns of the matches, the DUPR Log, the SMAD DUPR Log and the badges, with no foreign key to the roster. The bot was given the same rule (player_data.player_slug) and wrote its rows by turning a player's current name into a slug.

That works only while a member's name never changes. A slug is made once, from the first spelling, and the roster keeps it; but names change, most often during onboarding, when an organizer corrects a new member's name on League → Members, or a member is added under a full name and plays under a nickname. From then on the bot's name-made key and the roster's key disagree, and every row the bot writes for that member lands under a key their profile never reads.

On 10/22/26 two members joined during onboarding under one spelling of their names and played on 10/23/26 under another. That night's Post Game refit at 10:08 PM PT wrote their eight SMAD DUPR rows under the name-made keys. Their profiles showed no rating and no matches, though each had played six. Gene noticed at 6:12 PM PT on 10/25/26. A migration that moved the rows and a fix to the writer shipped at 7:22 PM PT, but the profiles still read a published copy of the ratings that only the next refit rebuilds; it was rebuilt by hand at 7:56 PM PT. Outage: 45 hours 48 minutes. Two members affected. No booking or message was wrong, but it cost money: $61.85 of Claude tokens measured on the rework (the 10/23 review, two migrations, the triage, the fixes and this post-mortem), on top of a first build of the slug-keyed tables estimated at about $310 whose key had to be redone. See "What it cost".

Impact

Where the design came from

When (PT)WhatSession
10/4/26 11:21 PMThe API's public player routes and the /players page make a slug from a name, as a web address, not a record key: e1bd4a00a desktop session (no Session trailer)
10/5/26 12:44 AMMigration 0002: players.slug becomes the roster row's key (9ed556e1)Mr Sandman
10/5/26 3:25 AMThe bot's player_slug is written as "the API's key for a player", pinned to the same rule (db949350)a desktop session (no Session trailer)
10/5/26 10:18 AMMigration 0009: matches, the DUPR Log and the SMAD DUPR Log key their players by slug, "without a foreign key (a guest is kept as written)"; the bot's rows are "taken as it sends it, each name with its slug beside it" (fd067f28)Mr Sandman
10/5/26 12:35 PMMigration 0012: badges keyed the same way (4ff6d61d)Mr Sandman
10/13/26 6:18 AMOrganizers can edit a member's first and last name on League → Members, on Gene's word; the key does not move with the name (a539bbea)Black Widow
10/23/26 2:48 PMGene: "matches should be keyed by player id"Gene
10/23/26 3:01 PMA design note concludes "a rename is already safe", having checked the tables but not the bot's writers (c87479cf); ticket #252 is filed at a low priority on that conclusionBlack Widow

The slug was planned as a web address and became the database's key without anyone weighing it against an integer id. The session that made it the record key was Mr Sandman, in migrations 0002, 0009 and 0012 on 10/5/26, during the roster's move from the Google Sheet to the database (ROADMAP step 2). No design document weighed ids against slugs until Gene asked for ids on 10/23/26, and the one written that afternoon declared renames safe without checking the writers, which kept the work at a low priority. Mr Sandman, Black Widow and Snow White all wrote code on top of the slug key for three weeks without raising it.

Timeline (PT)

What it cost

Bad design that reaches production is paid for twice: once to build it, and again to find it, fix it, migrate the data and write it up. Both payments here were Claude tokens (Gene, 10/25/26 10:50 PM PT: "there is monetary cost to bad code and design that makes it out to production, we need to quantify it").

How it was measured. Every Claude Code session on the desktop keeps a transcript with the tokens of each reply. A session turn (one prompt and the work it started) counts here only when it wrote or ran a file that exists for this problem alone (the player-ids plan, migrations 0046 and 0047, their tests, the fixes' tests, this post-mortem and its fact scripts) or its prompt was about it. A turn that only read shared code does not count, so these figures are a floor. Tokens are priced at Anthropic's API list prices (the rates in picklebot_core/claude_usage.py): what the same work costs on the API. Claude Code itself bills on the Max plan and its usage credits, so this is the value of the tokens spent, not a separate invoice.

PhaseWhen (PT)Claude tokensCost
First build: the slug-keyed tables, migrations 0002, 0009, 0012 and the bot's slug rule (3,641 lines in four commits)10/4-10/5/26not measured: built in a cloud session whose transcript is not on the desktopabout $310, estimated at the rework's measured rate per line
The review and plan that called renames safe (#252)10/23/26102.6 million$32.26
Id columns beside every slug, migration 0046 (#252 step 1)10/25/26, before 6:12 PM13.7 million$3.87
Triage, the fix and migration 0047, the rebuilds (#334, #335, #338)10/25/26, 6:12-8:00 PM34.6 million$9.97
Five more writers, reads by id, this post-mortem (#353, #354)10/25/26, after 8:00 PM57.9 million$15.75
Rework, measured208.9 million$61.85

Not counted: Gene's time (not measured), the releases that carried the fixes (they ran on the desktop's own runners, about $0), and the 46 hours two new members spent in their first week seeing a profile that said they had never played. An id key on 10/5/26 would have cost almost nothing more than the slug did: the rework is the price of not weighing it.

Production bug tickets from this design

TicketWhat it wasFix
⚪#334Two members' SMAD DUPR and matches missing from their profiles: rows filed under name-made keys011ad6e7 and migration 0047
⚪#335The fix reached the database but not the profiles: the published ratings were not rebuilt after the migration24501d15
⚪#338Alert: the hand rebuild failed (a PowerShell quoting error in the command Snow White gave)the rerun at 7:56 PM
⚪#353Five more writers built keys from names (ledgers, health, vote queue, Venmo sync, Top 5)7b4c93dd
⚪#252The root: records keyed by an integer player id, asked for by Gene on 10/23/26step 1 06b5fe50 (0046)
⚪#354Step 2: reads by id, so a renamed member keeps every match, rating and badgeabf883dd

Why it happened

  1. A display value became a key. A slug is made from a name, and a name changes. Using it as the primary reference between tables, with no foreign key, meant a name change silently split a member's history. Nothing failed loudly: rows were written, just under a key no screen read.
  2. Two copies of one rule. The API made slugs once, at insert; the bot remade them from the current name at every write. They agreed only while names never changed.
  3. No design review weighed the key. The choice was made in passing during the database move, and the first review of it (10/23/26) checked the tables but not the writers, and called renames safe.
  4. A data fix had a second home. The profiles read a published copy of the ratings; the migration fixed the database and nobody rebuilt the copy.
  5. The onboarding flows were built on top without revisiting the key: name edits (10/13/26), claims, approvals, the member sync and Invite a Friend all create or rename members.

Action items

ItemTicketFix
Move the misfiled rows and make the bot's writers use the roster slug⚪#334Done 011ad6e7
A migration that applies rebuilds the published ratings⚪#335Done 24501d15
The five other name-made keys use the roster slug, and a test refuses any new one⚪#353Done 7b4c93dd
Integer player-id columns beside every slug column (step 1)⚪#252Done 06b5fe50, migration 0046
History read by id: matches, ratings and badges follow a member's id, so a renamed member keeps everything; the badges route finds a renamed member by name; a test renames a member and reads their history back⚪#354Done abf883dd
The rule written down for every project: a record's key is an integer id; a name, slug or email is never a key or a reference between tables; a new reference column comes with its id and foreign key⚪#354Done claude-shared CLAUDE.md, "A record's key is an integer id; a name never is", and tests/test-reference-ids.py, which refuses a new migration's player text column without its id and foreign key
The few columns still holding a player as text with no id (Game Plan claims, who ran Post Game, who marked Late / Here / Left) get their ids⚪#358Done dc453049
Make slugs editable safely, or freeze them as permanent handles with a redirect for the rare rename⚪#527Open Gene's decision
Every post-mortem prices its rework in Claude tokens, measured from the transcripts the same way, so the cost of a design that reached production is a number, not a feeling⚪#357Done 209db22d

Written by Snow White on 10/25/26 PT at Gene's request ("call out all the production bug tickets that resulted from this architecture poor decision, and call out the session who planned this in the first place"), from the git history, the tickets, migration 0047 and a read of production's rows. Every timestamp is observed, none estimated. Commits are named by their subject line and linked.

Incident record: ops/incidents.json → 2026-10-25-name-slugs-split-member-history

Shareable page: https://smadpicklebot.com/postmortems#pm-2026-10-25-name-slugs-split-member-history

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SMAD PickleBot · Post-mortem

Post Mortem: 10/23/26 A test run started the 8 AM run at midnight

At 12:11 AM on Friday 10/23/26, the daily job smad-daily ran its whole 8 AM routine eight hours early. Nobody asked it to. A Claude Code session that Snow White had started that night, to move the 8 AM run onto the event bus, was running its own new unit tests on the desktop. Some of the tests reached Google Cloud for real and started production jobs. Thirteen of the fourteen starts failed at once, on arguments the deployed jobs did not know. The fourteenth, smad-daily with no arguments, ran.

Outage
2 min (12:11:22 to 12:13:30 AM, the midnight run's own length)
Failed
10/23/26 12:11:07 AM
Detected
10/23/26 12:27 AM by Gene, from the alert mailer's emails about the failed starts
Fix pushed
10/23/26 12:34 AM (e054753c, the decoupling commits reverted on hopper; nothing had reached main)
Restored
10/23/26 12:13:30 AM (the midnight run ended; nothing else started; the source stopped at 12:29 AM)

Summary

What the daily job does. smad-daily is the 8 AM runner. It refreshes the court cache, creates the weekly poll on poll day, schedules Last Call, posts Games This Week, sends the Game Day reminder to the group and to each player who is In, saves the day's game plan, sends vote and balance reminders, syncs Venmo, posts the Hall of Shame and Fame, and does a few more steps, each under its own condition. Started with no arguments, it runs all of them for today's date.

What went wrong. The session was building picklebot_core/daily_bus.py, which starts the court-booking, commands and payment-sweep jobs from the event bus. Its helper that starts a job used the real Cloud Run start, picklebot_core/cloud_run_jobs.start, whenever the caller passed no stand-in. On the desktop, that call gets a production token from gcloud, which is signed in with Gene's project rights. Some of the new tests passed no stand-in, so running them on the desktop POSTed real starts to Cloud Run: smad-court-booking eight times, smad-commands three times, smad-payment-sweep twice and smad-daily once. Their arguments carry the tests' own fixture data (run ids "r" and "r1", and a Saturday 10/24 date).

The deployed court-booking, commands and payment-sweep images were the previous release's. They refused the new arguments and exited with an error before doing anything. The smad-daily start carried no arguments, so the deployed job did what it always does and ran the full routine.

Why the same tests are safe elsewhere. On Linux the suites run in the tests image, which holds no Google credentials, so the start would have failed with no token. The session ran them on the Windows desktop, where gcloud is signed in.

End-user impact.

Financial impact. $0.

Who did what

Timeline (PT)

whenwhat
10/22/26 11:10 PMSnow White starts the session "Decouple the daily job onto the event bus"
10/23/26 12:00 AMThe session's first push on hopper (e5f3b684), the flag off
12:11:07 AMThe first real start from a test: smad-court-booking, then smad-payment-sweep and smad-commands; each fails on its arguments
12:11:22 AMsmad-daily starts with no arguments, the run for today's date
12:12:28 AMThe Game Day reminder posted to the SMAD Pickleball group; the four players In messaged and emailed
12:13:07 to 12:13:25 AMVote reminders to eight members, balance reminders to two
12:13:30 AMThe run ends; nothing else starts
12:20 AMThe session's second push on hopper (f95445dc)
12:27 AMGene reports the errors
12:29 AMSnow White stops the session's turn
12:34 AMBoth decoupling commits reverted on hopper (e054753c); Gene: the 8 AM run goes as usual

Why it shipped

Nothing shipped: the code never reached main. The harm came from running tests, which no gate checks.

Action items

#itemstatuswhere
1Stop the session; take its commits off hopper so they cannot shipdone 12:34 AMe054753c
2Snow White does production-touching work itself; spawned sessions and agents only readdoneSnow White's working rules, 10/23/26
3A real Cloud Run job start, through urllib's own transport, refuses anywhere but Cloud Run (K_SERVICE or CLOUD_RUN_JOB) unless a hand run says SMAD_ALLOW_JOB_START=1, before it asks for a token: the bot's starter and the API's alike, so a test that forgets its stand-in fails instead of starting a job. Publishes and sends stay covered by item 4's guard in testsfixed 10/23/26 12:46 AM PT, in the commit "A real Cloud Run job start refuses anywhere but Cloud Run"picklebot_core/cloud_run_jobs.py live_start_allowed, services/api/member_sync.py _call
4Every suite, however it is started, runs off the network and with no Google credentials: tests/guard.py, imported by tests/pytest_suite.py and the three hand-rolled suites, strips the credential variables, points gcloud at an empty config and installs the offline guard in its own process and its children; tests/test-test-guard.py holds every suite to it. Proved on the desktop: a guarded process gets no token in-process (ci_claim.access_token) or from gcloud auth print-access-tokenfixed 10/23/26 12:40 AM PT, in the commit "Every suite runs off the network and with no Google credentials, however it is started"tests/guard.py, tests/offline/sitecustomize.py

So the SMAD Pickleball group got the Game Day reminder for that evening's game at 12:12 AM, and fourteen members got a direct message and an email between 12:12 and 12:13 AM. Gene chose to let the 8 AM run go as usual, so the same messages go out again at 8 AM.

Written by Snow White on 10/23/26 PT, from the Cloud Run job executions and their logs, Cloud Logging's audit entries, the session's transcript and the commits. Times are observed, not estimated.

Incident record: ops/incidents.json → 2026-10-23-test-run-started-the-8am-run-at-midnight

Shareable page: https://smadpicklebot.com/postmortems#pm-2026-10-23-test-run-started-the-8am-run-at-midnight

Alert that started it: the alert mailer's "SMAD: a bot command on Cloud Run failed (smad-commands daily-step gmail-watch …, Fri 10/23/26 12:11 AM PT)", one of the failed test starts; Gene reported it at 12:27 AM PT

← All post-mortems
SMAD PickleBot · Post-mortem · the alert mailer's "SMAD: a Venmo payment may not be recorded yet (venmo-sync-trigger, Wed 10/21/26 9:20 AM PT)", Slack and email, three seconds after the first error; Sentry issue SMAD-BOT-S

Post Mortem: 10/21/26 Venmo refused Google Cloud, and a member's payment was not recorded on its own

On Wednesday morning 10/21/26 a member paid Gene $10 by Venmo. Venmo's email reached Gene's inbox, and the payment sync started as it does for every Venmo email: the Cloud Function venmo-sync-trigger asks Venmo for the recent transactions, records any new one and sends the member a thank-you. This time Venmo answered 403 Forbidden before any transaction was read. The same happened three minutes later on the next email. The payment was not recorded, and the member got no thank-you.

Outage
27 min
Failed
10/21/26 9:20:25 AM
Detected
10/21/26 9:20:28 AM by the alert mailer (Slack and email); Gene, at the same moment, saw it as the member paid him
Fix pushed
10/21/26 9:41 AM (00bfbf55, the failover; production 10:04 AM)
Restored
10/21/26 9:47:14 AM (Venmo answered Google Cloud again: the payment sweep's dev run connected and read 44 transactions)

Summary

How a Venmo payment is recorded. Venmo emails Gene for every payment. Gmail tells the Cloud Function venmo-sync-trigger (a Pub/Sub push), which logs in to Venmo with the league's token from Google Cloud, reads the recent transactions, records each new one in the payments table and sends the payer a WhatsApp thank-you. The 8 AM daily job does the same sweep once a day, and Zelle has its own path.

What went wrong. Venmo refused the login from Google Cloud: 403 Forbidden, at 9:20:25 and again at 9:23:20 AM PT. The token was fine: at 9:47 AM the same token, from the same Google Cloud region, read the transactions without a word. Venmo has no public API and no published rule for this; it blocks some traffic it does not expect, and Google Cloud's addresses are shared with every other customer's. Our code had no second way to reach Venmo, so a refusal meant "not recorded" until someone stepped in.

It had happened once before. The 8 AM daily job's Venmo sweep got the same 403 on 10/16/26 at 8:00 AM PT (Sentry SMAD-BOT-S's first event). The next syncs that day went through, so nothing was missed, but nobody asked why. The Sentry issue sat unresolved for five days.

End-user impact. One member's $10 payment was recorded five minutes late, at 9:25:19 AM instead of about 9:20:25, by hand; their thank-you DM went out at 9:25:30. Until then their balance in the app still showed the $10 owed. No other payment was missed: the payment sweep at 9:47 AM read the 44 most recent Venmo transactions and found every one already recorded.

Financial impact. $0. No payment was lost or double-counted.

Who did what

Timeline (PT)

whenwhat
10/16/26 8:00:50 AMThe daily job's Venmo sweep gets 403 Forbidden (SMAD-BOT-S, first event); the day's later syncs go through; nobody follows up
10/21/26 9:20:22 AMA member's Venmo payment email reaches Gmail; the sync starts
9:20:25 AMVenmo refuses the login: 403 Forbidden. Zelle syncs fine
9:20:28 AMThe alert mailer tells Gene in Slack and by email
9:23:20 AMThe next email's sync is refused the same way
9:25:19 AMSnow White records the $10 from the desktop, on Gene's word
9:25:30 AMThe member's thank-you DM is sent
9:34 AMThe failover committed: a Venmo refusal on Google Cloud hands the sync to GitHub's runner and the desktop's (00bfbf55)
9:41 AMPushed to main with a test fix (8966fade), without a release order
9:47:14 AMVenmo answers Google Cloud again: the payment sweep's dev run reads 44 transactions, all already recorded
9:47 AMThe failover's order set to Gene's: Google Cloud, then the desktop's runner, then GitHub's (b6e3c941)
9:55 AMTwo words to ship enforced: the push gate refuses main without Gene's second ship word (claude-shared 74c8983)
10:00 AMThe alert mailer: "quiet, not fixed"
10:04:42 AMThe failover in production (venmo-sync-trigger-00722-q4v); the daily and sweep jobs at 10:05:48

Why it shipped

Nothing we shipped caused the refusal; Venmo did. What we shipped was a payment path with one way to reach Venmo, from addresses Venmo does not owe us any trust for, and no plan for a refusal. The 10/16 refusal was the warning, and an unresolved Sentry issue was all it left.

The push without a release order was a separate failure, of process: Snow White judged the failover an urgent production fix and pushed it alone. The release rule allowed that exception, but only when said out loud, and Snow White did not say it.

Action items

#itemstatuswhere
1When Venmo refuses Google Cloud, the function, the daily job and the sweep hand the sync to the desktop's runner, then GitHub's, which record and thank as usualfixed (shipped broken, repaired by item 5 and drilled by item 3 on 10/21/26 10:35 PM PT)00bfbf55, b6e3c941; in production 10/21/26 10:04 AM, but neither rung could run a sync until item 5 (item 3's drill)
2A push to main needs Gene's second ship word, checked by the push gate; a production fix goes through only when it says why, and Slack is toldfixedclaude-shared 74c8983 (and its follow-ups that day)
3Run the failover once on purpose (a dispatch of venmo-sync.yml on the desktop's runner and on GitHub's), so its first real use is not a member's paymentdone: the first drill (10/21/26 10:00 PM PT, on Gene's word) failed on both rungs, which found item 5; run again at 10:35 PM PT on 3580136f, with item 5 in production, both rungs reached Venmo and synced (44 payments, all already recorded, none unmatched): runs 39728923032 on the desktop's runner and 39728996087 on GitHub'sSnow White
5The failover reads the function's settings with a token Cloud Run and Secret Manager accept (the platform kit's token is scoped to Pub/Sub, and got 403 on both rungs), and a refused read stops its step instead of passing as success through teefixed, 9756576e, in production 10/21/26 10:35 PM PT with 3580136f, proved by item 3's second drillscripts/venmo-failover.py cloud_token; .github/workflows/venmo-sync.yml pipefail
4A Venmo refusal is resolved in Sentry with this post-mortem, so the next one opens a fresh issuefixedSMAD-BOT-S resolved 10/21/26 with this page

The alert reached Gene three seconds after the first refusal, just as he saw the payment arrive. Snow White recorded the payment by hand from the desktop five minutes later, on Gene's word, with the usual thank-you. By 9:47 AM Venmo was answering Google Cloud again. Nobody changed anything on our side to make that happen.

Written by Snow White, the session that recorded the payment and built the failover, on 10/21/26 PT, from Cloud Logging (the function, the alert mailer, the API, the WhatsApp sender, the payment sweep), Sentry's issue, the GitHub deployments and the commits. Times are observed, not estimated. Commits are named by their subject line and linked.

Incident record: ops/incidents.json → 2026-10-21-venmo-refused-google-cloud

Shareable page: https://smadpicklebot.com/postmortems#pm-2026-10-21-venmo-refused-google-cloud

← All post-mortems
SMAD PickleBot · Post-mortem · the alert mailer's "SMAD: a vote or match write was refused (vote-writer, Sun 10/18/26 8:46 PM PT)", Slack and email, two seconds after the first error; Sentry issue SMAD-BOT-X

Post Mortem: 10/18/26 A poll that was not the games poll was counted as game votes

On Sunday evening 10/18/26 Gene posted a poll in the SMAD Pickleball WhatsApp group: "Where will you run SMAD Picklebot App?", with the answers iPhone, Android and "Mobile/desktop web". The bot's vote webhook reads every poll vote in the group, and it had no way to tell its own weekly games poll from anyone else's. So eleven members' answers to Gene's question were treated as answers to the games poll: each was queued as a game vote, each member's Last Voted was stamped and a Poll Log row was written.

Outage
780 min
Failed
10/18/26 8:46:55 PM
Detected
10/18/26 8:46:57 PM by the alert mailer (Slack and email)
Fix pushed
10/19/26 9:33 AM (ff9e1add)
Restored
10/19/26 9:46:36 AM (smad-whatsapp-webhook-00737 and vote-writer-00159 serving production)

Summary

How a vote reaches the games. A member's tap on a poll in the group arrives at the vote webhook (webhook/main.py, handle_poll_update). It works out which options the member picked, writes the Poll Log row and Last Voted, and publishes one message per pick to the votes queue. The vote worker (webhook/vote-writer) takes each message, claims it once in Firestore under a key made from the member, the option and the time (dedup_key), and writes the vote to the game.

What went wrong, two ways.

  1. The webhook took any poll for the games poll. Nothing in handle_poll_update checked that a poll's options name a game date. That has been true since the WhatsApp integration began in January 2026; it never mattered because the bot's poll was the only poll in the group.
  2. The dedup key put a "/" into a Firestore path. dedup_key, written with the vote queue on 10/5/26, used the option's text as part of a document id. A "/" there splits the id into a path, and an odd number of parts is refused. The games poll's own options carry slashes too ("Wed 10/21/26 7pm"), so every vote key since 10/5 was quietly a nested path that happened to have an even number of parts. "Mobile/desktop web" made it odd.

End-user impact. Eleven members answered Gene's poll between 8:46 PM on 10/18 and 8:02 AM on 10/19, fourteen answers in all, and each had their Last Voted stamped (the 10/19 count said five; the Poll Log, read on 10/20, holds eleven). Their real In and Out for the week's games were never touched. A stamped Last Voted keeps a member off the "you have not voted" reminders, which ran at 8:01 AM on 10/19 (21 members) and 10/20 (15 members). Nine of the eleven had already answered the games poll, so the stamp changed nothing for them. Two had not:

No game, court booking or payment was affected.

Financial impact. $0.

Who did what

Timeline (PT)

whenwhat
1/20/26The WhatsApp integration: the webhook reads every poll vote in the group (2fae4f23)
10/5/26 3:44 AMThe vote queue: the worker's dedup key is built from the option's text (785519ae)
10/18/26 8:46 PMGene posts "Where will you run SMAD Picklebot App?" in the group
8:46:55 PMFirst error: "A document must have an even number of path elements" (SMAD-BOT-X)
8:46:57 PMThe alert mailer tells Gene in Slack and by email
9:16, 9:33 PM"Still failing"
9:33 PMThe first "Mobile/desktop web" messages reach votes-dead-letter after ten tries each
10:15 PMThe mailer says "Fixed: vote-writer" (30 minutes without an error; the failing revision still serving)
10:19 PMThe errors resume; told again
10:29 PMThe dead-letter incident is told (Monitoring → the mailer)
10/19/26 5:53 AMMr Sandman lists SMAD-BOT-X
8:05 AMLast error
8:35 AMFix committed: the webhook ignores a poll that is not the games poll; the dedup key writes "/" as "_" (ff9e1add)
9:33 AMPushed; held at dev (smad-whatsapp-webhook-00737, vote-writer-00159), smoke-tested
9:46:36 AMPromoted: the fixed revisions serve production
10/20/26 9:01 AMThe old nested dedup documents cleaned up (90 of 92 removed; 2 not yet expired)

Why it shipped

The webhook was written for a group with one poll in it, and no test fed it any other poll. The dedup key's tests used plain option names; the real labels' slashes made nested paths that Firestore happened to accept, so nothing failed until an option had an odd number of slashes.

Action items

whatfixed by
The webhook ignores a poll whose options name no game date and no cannot-play phrase (_is_games_poll), before any Poll Log row, Last Voted or voteff9e1add
The dedup key writes "/" as "_", so every key is one flat document idff9e1add
Tests: a non-games poll is ignored, the games and cannot-play polls still count, a key with a slashff9e1add
Clean up the nested dedup documents the slashes madedone 10/20/26 9:01 AM (dedup cleanup, 90 of 92)
Drop the two dead letters still in votes-dead-letter (one member's "Mobile/desktop web" answers)done 10/20/26 10:44 PM on Gene's word; the queue is empty
The mailer's "Fixed" after 30 quiet minutes while the revision that failed still servesthe incident keeps the failing revision; 30 quiet minutes with it still serving now say "quiet, not fixed" (10/20/26, alert-mailer)
Check whether any member missed a "you have not voted" reminder that weekdone 10/20/26: two members missed both reminders (above); one answered on their own, one got the last call

The vote worker rejected "iPhone" and "Android" cleanly, since no game has that name. "Mobile/desktop web" crashed it instead: the worker builds a Firestore document id from the answer, and the "/" in the answer is a path separator in Firestore, so every attempt raised "A document must have an even number of path elements". Each such message was retried ten times and then given up on, into the votes dead-letter queue. No real game vote was lost or changed.

Written by Snow White, the session that wrote the fix, on 10/20/26 PT, from Sentry's issue, the alert mailer's and Cloud Run's logs, the dead-letter queue, the commits and the session notes. Times are observed, not estimated. Commits are named by their subject line and linked.

Incident record: ops/incidents.json → 2026-10-18-other-poll-taken-for-games-poll

Shareable page: https://smadpicklebot.com/postmortems#pm-2026-10-18-other-poll-taken-for-games-poll

← All post-mortems
SMAD PickleBot · Post-mortem

Post Mortem: 10/14/26 The iPhone update's "What's new" lines went missing, for the fourth time

When the iPhone app updates itself, it shows a "What's new" card for a few seconds: the build it updated to and up to four lines, written for members by Claude when the update is published. On Wednesday 10/14/26 at 10:40 AM Gene's phone updated to build 20261014-1002 and the card said only "Updated 852702b for iOS 0.2.0 (13)": no build stamp, no lines. The lines existed. They had been written and published, but six seconds after the update itself, and the phone took the update in that gap.

Outage
271 min
Failed
10/14/26 10:40:11 AM
Detected
10/14/26 10:41 AM by Gene, from his phone
Fix pushed
10/14/26, shipped in the 3:10 PM phone update (the card waits for its own update's lines, c43fd02c)
Restored
10/14/26 3:10:42 PM (build 20261014-1435, the first update with the fix, published with all four lines; the kept notice whats-new/1b50a6b.json; recorded 10/20/26 by Snow White)

Summary

How the card gets its lines. A phone update is published by the App workflow in two steps. app/scripts/ota-publish.sh sends the update to the production channel and writes a small notice: the update's commit, its build stamp, the runtime it runs on and Claude's lines. app/scripts/ota-announce.sh then uploads that notice to the public reports bucket as app-update-ios.json (the latest update, which the next update replaces) and keeps a copy by commit as whats-new/<commit>.json. On the first launch after it updates, the phone reads app-update-ios.json once. If the notice names the build the phone is running, the card shows its stamp and lines. If it names any other build, or cannot be read, the card says "Updated" with the commit and nothing else.

Today: a race. The update went out at 10:40:11 AM. The notice was written two seconds later and reached the bucket at 10:40:17 AM. Gene's phone was open; it found the update, applied it and read the notice inside those six seconds, so it read the previous update's notice (20261014-0101), decided it was not its own, and showed no lines. Nothing on the phone asked again. A phone that updated after 10:40:17 would have shown the lines; any phone that updated in the gap showed none.

The three times before, each a different cause.

  1. 10/12/26, 9:04 and 9:28 AM: Claude wrote nothing. The first two updates after the card shipped carried notices with 0 lines: the script gave Claude too little room, and it spent all of it thinking before writing a word. Fixed by giving it the release notes' room (9:31 AM) and by falling back to the commit subjects when Claude writes nothing (10:15 AM).
  2. 10/13/26, 9:29 AM, 11:41 AM and 3:17 PM: no notice at all. At 2:57 AM phone updates began going through the Mac mini's Simulator first and then being republished to production. A republish's answer carries no runtime, the publish step needs the runtime to write the notice, and so three updates went out with no notice. The step said so only as a WARNING in the run log. Fixed at 3:30 PM by reading the runtime from the update the Simulator passed.
  3. 10/14/26, 12:25 AM: no notice again. That 3:30 PM fix called eas update:view with --non-interactive, a flag the command does not accept, so it failed, the runtime was never read and the 12:25 AM update went out with no notice. The test's stand-in for eas-cli accepted the flag, so the suite passed. Fixed at 12:28 AM, with the stand-in made to refuse the flag as the real one does.

End-user impact. Seven phone updates reached members without their "What's new" lines: two on 10/12, three on 10/13, one at 12:25 AM on 10/14, and today's for every phone that took it in its first six seconds. Those members saw "Updated <commit>" and did not learn what had changed from the card. The app itself worked; nothing was lost or wrong. The 8 AM release notes still told those changes, retold from their commits.

Financial impact. $0.

Who did what

Timeline (PT)

whenwhat
10/12/26 8:37 AMThe iPhone app updates itself when it is safe and then says what is new for a few seconds, in the same words the 8 AM release notes use: the card ships.
9:04:22 AM, 9:28:50 AMUpdates 52c270a and a870f0e go out with notices of 0 lines.
9:31 AMThe iPhone's "What's new" lines are actually written: Claude gets the same room to think as the morning release notes, instead of running out before it wrote a word. The 9:54 AM update carries its line.
10:15 AMWhen Claude cannot write an update's "What's new" lines, the phone shows the commit subjects instead, as it did before.
10/13/26 2:57 AMAn iPhone update reaches members only after the simulator has run that exact update and passed: updates are republished from dev, and the republish's answer has no runtime.
9:29:38 AM, 11:41:15 AM, 3:17:42 PMUpdates d05329a, 02d20a2 and 17850f4 go out with no notice ("runtime " empty in the log).
3:30 PMiPhone updates show their "What's new" lines again: the runtime is read from the group the Simulator passed, with a flag the command refuses.
10/14/26 12:25:47 AMUpdate 4814765: "the ios update's runtime could not be read, so no notice or What's new lines go to phones" (a WARNING).
12:28 AMPhone updates show their What's new lines again: the publish step reads the update's runtime with a flag eas-cli accepts. The 1:07 AM update carries 4 lines.
10:38:19 AMGene's "ship it" covers the iPhone; the phone update for build 20261014-1002 starts after the Mac mini's Simulator test passed.
10:40:11 AMThe update is published to the production channel.
10:40:13 AMIts notice is written, 4 lines.
10:40 AMGene's open phone takes the update, reads the previous notice and shows "Updated 852702b for iOS 0.2.0 (13)".
10:40:17 AMThe notice reaches the bucket (app-update-ios.json); the copy by commit at 10:40:22 AM.
10:41 AMGene sends the screenshot: a regression, fix it on dev, write a post-mortem.
10:43 AMThe cause found from the run log and the bucket's upload times.
10:44 AMThe fix written; its tests, including a replay of the race, pass. Committed and built to dev, not pushed (Gene: "this fix goes only to dev").

What broke, exactly

The phone treated one read of the latest notice as the final word. The update and its notice are published by two steps, one after the other, with no ordering between what a phone can see: eas update:republish makes the update downloadable the moment it returns, and the notice follows a few seconds later. components/WhatsNew read app-update-ios.json once on the first launch, and when that notice was another build's it showed "Updated" for good, since it also remembers the build as seen. It never read the copy kept for its own build, which a later update cannot overwrite either.

Why it shipped, and why it came back

Each fix tested the one mechanism that had failed: Claude's room to write, the runtime read, the flag. No test followed an update from publish to the card on a phone, so a new way to lose the lines passed every suite. The Simulator test on the Mac mini checks that the update runs and draws its first screen with its stamp; it does not check the card. And every miss so far was quiet: a notice of 0 lines is valid, a notice never written is a WARNING in a run log, and a phone that read the wrong notice says "Updated", which looks like success. Each time it was found by someone looking at a phone.

Action items

#itemstatuswhere
1The phone reads its own build's notice: the latest when it names this build, else whats-new/<commit>.json, and asks again every 5 s for up to a minute before it shows the card without lines. A test replays today's race (the notice up 6 s after the update)doneThe iPhone's "What's new" card waits for its own update's lines instead of reading the latest notice once (Black Widow, 10/14/26)
2ota-announce.sh uploads the copy kept by commit first, no-cache, before the latest notice, so the file the phone falls back to is never the last one writtendonethe same commit
3A notice the publish could not write is an ERROR that fails the publish step once the update is out, so the run files its issue, not a WARNING in the log: the 10/13 and 12:25 AM misses would have alerteddoneA phone update whose What's new notice cannot be written fails its publish step (Black Widow, 10/14/26)
4The Mac mini's Simulator test checks the card: after the update applies, the card shows the update's stamp and at least one linefixed (ships with the next phone update, whose Simulator test is its first live run, with Tim Apple): the desktop's phone build writes the lines at the dev publish (whats-new-dev/<sha>.json, which the dev channel's app reads), the simulator's flow checks the card's stamp and the first line's words, and production reuses those very linesThe Mac mini's Simulator test checks the What's new card, with the very lines members will get and The Simulator test closes the app once the update is downloaded, so the What's new card shows on the launch it checks (Black Widow, with Tim Apple's catch, 10/21/26)
5Publish the update's notice before the update itself, so no phone can take an update whose lines are not up yet. Needs both pipelines' steps split (on Cloud Build the publish runs where gcloud is not, and the upload is a later step); item 1 already covers the gapfixed (ships with the next phone update): through the simulator rung, the update's runtime is the group the simulator passed, so the notice kept by its commit goes up before the republish, on either pipeline; the emergency ladder=skip-dev upload still announces afterThe iPhone's What's new lines go up before its update does (Black Widow, 10/21/26)

It is the fourth time since the card was introduced on 10/12/26 that an update reached phones without its lines, each time for a different reason, and each fix closed only the one way it had failed. Gene: "a regression that happens twice, even if it isn't a site outage, is PM worthy".

Written by Black Widow, the session that built the card and its publish step, on 10/14/26 PT, from the App workflow's run logs, the reports bucket's kept notices and their upload times, and the commit history. Times are observed, not estimated. Commits are named by their subject line and linked.

Incident record: ops/incidents.json → 2026-10-14-whats-new-lines-lost

Shareable page: https://smadpicklebot.com/postmortems#pm-2026-10-14-whats-new-lines-lost

Alert that started it: none. Gene saw it on his phone at 10:40 AM and sent a screenshot at 10:41 AM.

← All post-mortems
SMAD PickleBot · Post-mortem

Post Mortem: 10/13/26 Tuesday's match recording went wrong: a test match left in, suggestions that changed players, and duplicates

On Tuesday 10/13/26 the 7 PM game's match record went wrong in the app, and Gene, the night's scorekeeper, stopped trusting it partway through. A test match he had recorded at 5:43 PM, before the game, was never removed, so every real match sat one number higher than he expected. Lettered Game Plan suggestions changed their players without changing their letters, so a suggestion he announced on court showed different players by the time he recorded it. He re-entered two matches with /pb match, which duplicated them, recorded the rest by hand in Build a Match, and posted the last two results in WhatsApp without recording them. Snow White and Black Widow rebuilt the night from the logs; on Gene's word Snow White removed the test match and the two duplicates and added the two WhatsApp results, leaving 15 matches, before Gene ran Post Game at 12:39 AM. No rating was published from the wrong record.

Outage
379 min
Failed
10/13/26 17:43:50
Detected
10/13/26 20:13:04 by Gene, on court (his first re-entry of a match he could not find)
Fix pushed
10/14/26 00:24 (app), 00:32 (backend)
Restored
10/14/26 00:03 (the night's matches repaired)

Summary

Game day in the app works like this. The Game Plan lists suggested matches, each with a letter (A, B, C…). The scorekeeper can tap Start on a suggestion when a match begins and Record when it ends, record a suggestion directly, or type any four players into Build a Match. Recorded matches are numbered in the order they are saved. A recorded match has a Remove button.

Three things went wrong, and the third came from the first two.

1. The test match stayed. At 5:43 PM, 77 minutes before the game, Gene recorded a match on suggestion C to check the app after the day's changes, and believed he removed it. Remove takes two taps: the first only arms it ("Tap to Remove"), the second deletes. His phone sent no delete: the API received none between 5:43 PM and 8:26 PM, PostHog shows the app closed 58 seconds after the record, and the phone's analytics did not record taps, so a single arming tap leaves no trace. The test match kept number 1, and every real match of the night was numbered one higher than Gene expected.

2. A suggestion's letter kept its name while its players changed. Letters were introduced on 10/9/26 so that a suggestion keeps one name through every redraw of the plan, and a recorded suggestion's letter is retired so it is never reused. But every redraw asked the planner for a fresh list, and an open suggestion the fresh list did not repeat was dropped and its letter handed to a new pairing. Only a suggestion someone had tapped Start on was protected. The bot's own replies show it: at 8:13 PM suggestion B was Gene and a partner against two players; one record later, at 8:14 PM, B had one of those two replaced by the player who had just arrived. Gene announced B on court, and when he tapped B at the end of the game the record box held different people. Twice (8:25 PM and 8:46 PM) he tapped Start, saw the wrong players, released it within seconds and typed the match into Build a Match instead.

3. Duplicates. At 8:13 and 8:14 PM, unable to find two matches he had recorded (they sat under numbers 2 and 3, not 1 and 2), Gene asked the players and re-entered them with /pb match in the main group. Both re-entries came out identical, players and scores, to what the app had already saved, which also shows those two were recorded correctly. From 8:27 PM he recorded everything in Build a Match, and posted the last two results, at 9:45 and 10:05 PM, as plain WhatsApp messages without /pb.

The game before, recorded perfectly without Start. Gene's own read (10/14/26 12:56 AM PT): "I had a feeling Start mode had a lot to do with the shiftiness of Tuesday night's recordings, because this actually wasn't the first time we used the app ... we had Start turned off, and the recordings were PERFECT then". The logs agree. The previous real game, Thursday 10/8/26 8 PM, recorded 16 matches in the app with no Start at all, no removal and no re-entry: almost every match was recorded straight from a suggestion card, the path that sends the card's own four players. Tuesday's trouble came from Start, which named a suggestion by its letter alone (below), together with the redraw that moved a letter's players. Start Match is off from the next game (Gene turned it off in League → Settings at 12:06 AM PT 10/14/26), and Gene will consider removing the Start option altogether if it cannot be made to work properly.

The repair. Snow White and Black Widow rebuilt the night from the API log (which names every record, removal, Start and presence change with its players), the plan's saved state and the WhatsApp history, and Gene confirmed each match. At 12:03 AM on 10/14/26, on Gene's go, Snow White removed the test match and the two duplicates through the API's admin routes and added the two WhatsApp results, stamped to the second of Gene's messages. Post Game had not run, so no rating had been published from the wrong record; Gene ran it from the app at 12:39 AM on the corrected 15 matches.

End-user impact. For the night, the match record in the app (and the Win Loss Log behind every rating, streak and badge) held one test match and two duplicates and lacked two matches, from 5:43 PM on 10/13/26 until 12:03 AM on 10/14/26. Gene, as the scorekeeper, spent part of the game re-asking players for results and re-entering them. No player's rating, standing or report was published from the wrong record: the refit only happens at Post Game, which ran after the repair. Members who opened Today during the game saw the wrong numbering.

Financial impact. $0. Matches do not feed invoices; hours come from the votes, which were unaffected.

Who did what

Timeline (PT)

whenwhat
10/6/26The Remove button on a recorded match looks like the Start button: Remove arms on the first tap and deletes on the second.
10/9/26Suggested matches are lettered A, B, C everywhere and A recorded suggestion's letter is retired for the rest of the game: a letter's name survives a redraw; its players were only protected once started.
10/13/26 17:43:50Gene records a test match on suggestion C, 77 minutes before the game. No delete follows; the app closes 58 s later.
18:01The Game Plan goes to the group with A, B, D and E (C already used by the test).
19:22The first real match is recorded on suggestion A, correctly; it is number 2.
19:44:19The second is typed into Build a Match (number 3). The arriving eighth player is registered 15 s later and the plan redraws.
20:00–20:09Three more are typed in (numbers 4–6), two of them the other court's games entered afterward.
20:13:04, 20:14:03Gene re-enters two matches with /pb match; both duplicate numbers 2 and 3. The bot's replies show B's players changed between the two.
20:25:51Start on B returns a pairing Gene did not announce; released at 20:26:11; typed in by hand.
20:26:40–20:27:12A typed record is removed 6 s later and re-entered with the score corrected (number 9). From here every match goes through Build a Match.
20:46:23Start on E, released 2 s later; the same four are typed in.
21:01–21:03, 21:28, 22:05Players are marked Left as they go home (two marked back to record a match, then Left again).
21:45:16, 22:05:40The last two results are posted in the main group without /pb; never recorded.
22:56Gene reports it to Snow White; Snow White and Black Widow start the forensics.
23:26–23:53Gene confirms the rebuilt timeline match by match.
10/14/26 00:03On Gene's go, the test match and the two duplicates are removed and the two WhatsApp results added: 15 matches.
00:24Black Widow's app release: one-tap Remove, the record box held to the card's four, the score-row hold, every tap captured, Today held for Post Game (Recording a match is safer after the 10/13 game).
00:32Snow White's backend release: A suggested match keeps its four players until it is recorded or one of them leaves and Today's Game stays open after a played game until Post Game is done, live at 00:34.
00:39:49–00:40:08Gene runs Post Game from the app on the 15 matches.

What broke, exactly

Why it shipped

Action items

#itemstatuswhere
1A lettered suggestion's four players are fixed until it is recorded or one of its own players leaves, goes Out or is marked Late; new suggestions only take letters never used that game; Redo issues new lettersdoneA suggested match keeps its four players until it is recorded or one of them leaves
2Remove is one tap, no confirm, no undo (Gene: "if I deleted a match by mistake, I can always reenter it easily")doneRecording a match is safer after the 10/13 game
2aEvery other "tap again to confirm" button goes too (Gene, 12:41 AM PT 10/14/26: "Get rid of all double push confirmation buttons"): Post Game, Notify, Sync Members, Invite All, Invite / Send Again, Link, Unlink, Archive, SIM Stop act on their first tapdone (ships with the next app release)Every button acts on its first tap: no "tap again" confirmation anywhere in the app (dcde6909, Black Widow)
3A Start that returns players other than the card shows is released at once with "match B changed since this list was drawn" and a reread, so a record box never holds four the card did not showdonethe same commit
4The score rows hold their order once a digit is typed (the forecast arriving late can no longer swap winners and losers)donethe same commit
5Every tap on the phone is captured in PostHog by its control's label (no on-screen text, no money screens), and match records, starts and removals carry the letter, the four players, the score and the match iddonethe same commit
6Today stays open after a played game until its Post Game is done (capped by the settings record's post_game_hold_hours, 36), so the scorekeeper reviews the night in the app before posting it; In/Out still closes at the game's enddoneToday's Game stays open after a played game until Post Game is done, the app's side
7Start Match turned off for the next game (Gene: "the start times from Start Mode are useless"); the game before, Thursday 10/8/26, recorded 16 matches without Start and without a single correctiondoneLeague → Settings, Gene, 12:06 AM PT 10/14/26
7aDecide whether to remove the Start option altogether (Gene: "I will contemplate deleting the Start option, if we cannot get it to work properly")openGene
8A SIM-game smoke test that records a suggested match through the app's own path and checks the recorded four equal the card's, plus one that redraws the plan under an open carddone 10/21/26 10:39 PM PT: the live pass's first clean run on dev, after the release 3580136f put the tester permission there (A recorded at 11-7 with its card's four; the redraw closed B's open card with its note and recorded nothing; the game stopped). Its first two runs found two faults of the pass itself, fixed in the commit that closes this item: a label with no date and time left the plan unread, and a fixed wait missed the five-second note. The app half (Gene, 10/21/26 10:08 PM PT: "App test now, live later"): Today's suite drives a card as a scorekeeper does and pins both cases (a redraw that keeps A's four leaves its typed score and Record sends those four; a redraw that gives the letter A to another four closes the open card with "Match A is no longer in the plan.", sends nothing, and the new A opens empty and records its own four), on every app build. Left: the live SIM-game smoke. Its account can now play one (Gene, 10/21/26 10:13 PM PT: "a SIM tester permission for the smoke account, its own SIM games only"): the smoke account, a tester, may start and stop a SIM game of testers alone that seats it, on hopper for the 10/22 release. The browser pass is written (Black Widow, 10/21/26 10:24 PM PT): smoke_signin.sim_pass, run off production only (smoke_signin's own run against a non-production address, and dev_check.py --sim), a WARNING like the rest; it starts a SIM game of four testers, records A at 11-7 on its own card and checks the recorded four are A's, types a score on the next card, redraws, checks the card keeps its four and score or closes with its note and nothing is recorded, and stops the game in every case.Black Widow (the app path, done) and Snow White (the SIM game and the redraw)
9A match recorded before its game starts warns the scorekeeper; a /pb match identical to a match already saved in the last few minutes asks before recordingfixed (Black Widow, 10/21/26; ships with the next app release), on the app's Today tab as Gene asked (5:22 PM PT: "saving us API trip and db hit"; /pb commands unchanged): Today asks once more before recording a match before the game starts, or the same match again. Before the game's start, or with the same two sides and score as any match already recorded in the game, Record takes a second tap with the warning shown after the first, on every way to record; nothing is sent until thenBlack Widow
10The backdate tool reads the game's players from the database, not the sheet, and numbers after the game's last matchfixed (Snow White, 10/21/26): Picklebot no longer reads or writes the retired Google Sheet anywhere (10/15/26) moved the tool's reads (get_poll_games, get_full_player_data) and its numbering (next_match_id over the game's recorded matches) to the databaseSnow White
11A vanished letter's Start says "Match B is no longer suggested" instead of the API's generic not-found textfixed (Black Widow, 10/21/26), before this post-mortem was written: since Suggested matches are lettered A, B, C everywhere (10/9/26) the Start route answers a letter the plan no longer lists with a 404 saying "Match B is no longer suggested: the plan has changed, refresh to see it", tests/test-api-matches.py pins it, and Today shows the API's text as it isBlack Widow

Written by Snow White with Black Widow, the two sessions that built the code involved, on 10/14/26 PT, from the API's request and application logs, the matches and plan-starts tables, the Game Plan's saved state in Firestore, the main group's WhatsApp history, PostHog's events from the scorekeeper's phone and the commit history. Times are observed, not estimated. Commits are named by their subject line and linked.

Incident record: ops/incidents.json → 2026-10-13-match-recording

Shareable page: https://smadpicklebot.com/postmortems#pm-2026-10-13-match-recording

Alert that started it: none. Gene saw it on court during the game and reported it to Snow White at 10:56 PM.

← All post-mortems
SMAD PickleBot · Post-mortem · the Sentry issue SMAD-BOT-9, "Blocked 'connect' from 'local.smadpicklebot.com'" (a browser's blocked-connection report, first seen 8:16 AM), which the watchdog's sweep filed as GitHub issue #134 at 8:41 AM. Both are closed pointing here.

Post Mortem: 10/10/26 The web app called a developer's test address instead of the API, after the app began to be built on the desktop

From 7:51 AM to 9:26 AM PT on Saturday 10/10/26, smadpicklebot.com/app could not reach the API. Every request the web app made, starting with sign-in, went to a developer's local test address, which on any visitor's computer points back at that computer, and the site's security policy blocked it. The iPhone app was not affected: its last update was from the night before. The cause was the change that morning to build the app once, on the desktop: the desktop's local developer setting for the API address was baked into the build. Mr Sandman fixed the build and the clean build was live at 9:26 AM.

Outage
95 min
Failed
10/10/26 07:51:08
Detected
10/10/26 08:16 by Sentry (the browser's report); issue #134 at 08:41; the cause named by the Alert Investigator at 09:18
Fix pushed
10/10/26 09:22
Restored
10/10/26 09:25:58

Summary

That morning Gene asked for the app pipeline to follow twelve-factor's build, release, run: build the app once and promote that same build, instead of each pipeline building its own. Black Widow wrote app/scripts/artifact.py, which exports the web app (and, later that morning, only when a phone update ships, the iPhone bundle) on the desktop, at no cost, keyed by the app's content and its public config; GitHub Actions and Cloud Build then fetch that build and ship it. It went out with The app is built once on the desktop and that same build is shipped to the web and the iPhone by both pipelines, and its first desktop build was live at 7:51:08 AM.

The desktop is also where the app is developed. There, the app's local settings file, which git never sees, sets the API address to the desktop's own development proxy, so the dev server can be used through a real HTTPS address. The build script knew this and tried to keep it out: it removed that setting from the environment it handed to the export. But the export tool reads the local settings file from disk by itself, after the environment is set, so the development address went into the bundle anyway. On the build servers, which have no such file, the app had always fallen back to the real API. That was the only reason the same code had worked before.

The signed-in smoke test that runs after every web deploy caught it on the first push: "sign-in did not finish: TimeoutError ... 1 problem". It is report-only until it is switched on as an alarm, so the run stayed green, and Black Widow reported that run's step times as a success without reading the test's verdict. Four later pushes changed only the build scripts and the pipelines. Each was built again on the desktop with the same flaw, or shipped the last build again where the app's content had not changed, and the smoke test, counting a build-script change as "nothing the web shows", skipped them all.

At 8:16 AM a browser's blocked-connection reports reached Sentry as SMAD-BOT-9, and the watchdog's sweep turned it into GitHub issue #134 at 8:41 AM. At 9:18 AM the Alert Investigator measured the live bundle (the development address once, the real API not at all) and named the cause. Mr Sandman pushed The web app works again: it calls the real API instead of a developer's test address at 9:22 AM: a release build now sets the real API address itself, which a local file cannot override, and a build whose API address is a test one refuses to ship. That changed the app's content, so the pipeline built a clean web app on GitHub's runner; it was live at 9:25:58 AM.

End-user impact. For 95 minutes the web app at smadpicklebot.com/app could not sign anyone in or load anything: Home, Games, Roster, Me, League and Today's Game. Everything outside the web app kept working: the iPhone app (its last update, from 7:37 PM the night before, predates the change), the WhatsApp bot, polls and reminders, and the site's other pages. Sentry recorded one browser session, 13 blocked calls at 8:16 AM; whose it was is not known. No member reported it.

Financial impact. $0. Nothing was charged, booked, paid or lost. No vote or match could be entered in the web app during the window; the iPhone app and the WhatsApp poll took them throughout.

Who did what

Timeline (PT)

whenwhat
07:43Gene: "Do build once path first, then put profile through new path and benchmark compared to old build everywhere."
07:48Black Widow builds the first desktop artifact; the local settings file supplies the development API address to the export.
07:49The app is built once on the desktop and that same build is shipped to the web and the iPhone by both pipelines pushed.
07:51:08GitHub's run publishes the desktop's web build. Outage starts.
~07:52The signed-in smoke test cannot finish signing in (TimeoutError, 1 problem); report-only, so the run is green. Black Widow reports the run's step times.
07:56–08:53Four more pushes (two Cloud Build fixes with the parallel GitHub steps, the web-only build, the cloud-only label) ship desktop builds with the same flaw; the smoke test skips them as script-only changes.
08:16Sentry records SMAD-BOT-9: 13 calls to the development address, blocked by the site's security policy. Detected.
08:41:26The watchdog's sweep opens GitHub issue #134 from SMAD-BOT-9.
09:18The Alert Investigator's note: the live bundle names the development address and never the API; the cause, and the fix to make.
09:22:18The web app works again: it calls the real API instead of a developer's test address pushed by Mr Sandman.
09:25:58GitHub's run publishes a clean web build (209dae7): the bundle names the real API and not the development address. Restored.
09:26Black Widow confirms the live bundle and that no phone update shipped in the window.

What broke, exactly

app/scripts/artifact.py, as of 32b5d86:

env = {**os.environ, 'CI': '1', ...}
# The local .env.local (the dev server's) must not reach a release build.
env.pop('EXPO_PUBLIC_API_URL', None)
run(['npx', 'expo', 'export', '--platform', 'web', ...], cwd=APP, env=env)

Removing the variable from the environment does not stop it: expo export loads the app's dotenv files from disk when it starts, and a variable the environment does not set is taken from the file. On the desktop the file sets the development proxy's address. The fix sets the real API address in the environment, which a dotenv file never overrides, and checks the built bundle for it.

Why it shipped

Action items

#itemstatuswhere
1A release build sets the real API address itself, and refuses to ship a bundle naming a test address or not naming the real APIdoneThe web app works again: it calls the real API instead of a developer's test address (Mr Sandman)
2The smoke test checks every page when the build script changes, and a skipped run no longer crashesdoneThe live smoke test checks every page when the app's build script changes, and a push it skips no longer crashes it (Black Widow)
3A failed smoke test against production is the alarm (the deploy fails and files the alert); against dev or any other address it only warns. No switch decides itdoneThe smoke test alarms on production alone and never signs in as Apple's reviewer (Black Widow; Gene: "failed smoke test of production promotion should be an alarm yes")
6The smoke test never signs in as Apple's reviewer's test account: every deploy's run had used up Clerk's code limit on it during Apple's review. It signs in only as its own account, and skips without onedonethe same commit (Gene: "reviewer account is dedicated for apple reviewer, period")
7A dedicated smoke-test account in Clerk, then the smoke test passing against production before it is relied onfixed (Snow White, 10/21/26): the deploy smoke test gets its own sign-in account (10/10/26, declared in infra/clerk/backend-production.json); the desktop web smoke has signed in with it and passed against production on every web release sinceGene creates the account; Snow White declares it in infra/clerk
4A deploy report reads the smoke test's verdict line, never only its status or timedoneBlack Widow's standing rule, recorded 10/10/26
5After every app push, open the live web app signed in before calling the push done; when the browser cannot, say sodone, restatedBlack Widow's standing rule (10/7/26), not followed this morning

Written by Black Widow, the session that wrote and pushed the change, on 10/10/26 PT, from the GitHub Actions run records, the live bundle, Sentry's issue as the Alert Investigator read it, and the smoke test's own output. Times are observed, not estimated. Commits are named by their subject line and linked.

Incident record: ops/incidents.json → 2026-10-10-web-app-dev-api-address

Shareable page: https://smadpicklebot.com/postmortems#pm-2026-10-10-web-app-dev-api-address

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SMAD PickleBot · Post-mortem

Post Mortem: 10/10/26 WhatsApp poll votes did not reach the app for 13 hours, after the sheet stopped being written in real time

From 8:01 AM to 9:02 PM PT on Saturday 10/10/26, nobody's answer to the week's WhatsApp poll reached the database, which the app reads. Nineteen poll votes from fifteen members, 71 game answers for Tuesday through Friday 10/13–10/16/26, were taken by the bot and then dropped, so the app showed next week's games with almost no one in. The cause was the poll's dependence on the Google Sheet: since the sheet stopped being written in real time on 10/8/26, the poll could not add the week's columns to it, and the vote handler gave up on any vote that had no column to go in. Snow White fixed the handler, wrote every lost vote from the bot's own log into the database by 9:02 PM, and while doing so briefly re-created the Monday game Gene had cancelled that morning.

Outage
781 min
Failed
10/10/26 08:01:41
Detected
10/10/26 20:56 by Gene, in the app
Fix pushed
10/10/26 21:00
Restored
10/10/26 21:02:24

Summary

Every Saturday at 8 AM the bot posts the week's poll in the SMAD Pickleball group. When a member taps an answer, the vote webhook works out which games they picked and queues one vote per game for the database. Its first step was to find each poll option's column on the main sheet, and a vote whose options matched no column stopped there with "No matching date columns".

On 10/8/26 the sheet stopped being written as things happen: Realtime sheet writes can be turned off for a nightly sync — built dark behind the settings record's sheet_sync made every Sheets write a logged no-op under the settings record's sheet_sync = nightly, outside the nightly job's export steps, and the setting was switched to nightly that day (Gene: "turn off real time update and rely on nightly sync - 1 day stale sheet is fine"). Saturday's poll was the first weekly poll under it. The poll asked for its five game columns on the sheet, the write was skipped, and the log still said "Added 5 new date columns". From the first vote at 8:01:41 AM to the last at 7:11:54 PM, every poll vote found no column and was dropped before it reached the queue. The database had the games, created from the poll database-first; only the sheet lacked them.

Nothing alarmed: the webhook logged each drop at INFO, and the votes that reach the database by other routes (the app, /pb register) kept working, so the app looked like a quiet week. Gene noticed at about 8:56 PM that the poll's answers were not in the app, and Black Widow passed it to Snow White at 8:58 PM.

Snow White pushed WhatsApp poll votes reach the database again when the sheet has no column for the week's games at 9:00 PM: the webhook now finds the voter and the games by the database alone and queues every vote, with the sheet's columns no longer in the way. It was live at 9:01:58 PM. The lost votes were rebuilt from the webhook's own log, which records each voter's full selection at every tap: each member's latest selection, 'in' for a game picked and 'out' for one not, written to the database between 9:01:56 and 9:02:24 PM. Answers members had since given in the app were left as they were.

The Monday game. The poll still offered Monday 10/12/26 2pm South, which Gene had cancelled at 3:28 PM with /pb cancel game, removing it from the database and telling the group. The backfill found no Monday game and Snow White created it, at 9:01:35 PM, to hold the Monday answers, without asking why it was missing. Snow White noticed the cancellation and deleted the game and its 15 'out' answers at 9:03:52 PM. For those two minutes the app could show Monday as the next game. A poll vote for a game cancelled after the poll went out is no longer queued (9:05 PM) made the webhook skip and log a vote for any game the database does not have. A few Monday votes queued in the minutes before that was live retried in the vote writer, each attempt logged as an error; A queued vote for a cancelled game is dropped instead of retried (9:09 PM) made a "no such game" answer final, and the four that reached the dead-letter queue were dropped by hand.

End-user impact. For 13 hours the app showed next week's games, Tuesday through Friday 10/13–10/16/26, without the answers fifteen members had given in the WhatsApp poll, so anyone deciding from the app whether a game would fill saw too few players. The poll itself, the bot's replies, the app's own voting and every other feature kept working. No game was played in the window, so no game plan, match or court decision was made from the wrong counts. For about two minutes the app could show the cancelled Monday game.

Financial impact. $0 so far. Invoices are still computed from the sheet's game columns, and the week's columns were never added, so until a repair the week's games would have been left off members' invoices. Tonight's nightly sync now adds any game column the sheet lacks before writing the votes (action item 4), and those columns are in place before any invoice for these games.

Who did what

Timeline (PT)

whenwhat
10/8/26 06:16Realtime sheet writes can be turned off for a nightly sync — built dark behind the settings record's sheet_sync pushed; sheet_sync is switched to nightly that day.
10/10/26 08:01The weekly poll goes out with Monday through Friday. Its five sheet columns are skipped as held writes; the log says they were added.
08:01:41The first poll vote: "No matching date columns", not queued. Outage starts.
15:28Gene cancels Monday 10/12/26 2pm South with /pb cancel game; the group is told.
19:11:54The last of 19 lost poll votes.
~20:56Gene sees the poll's answers missing from the app. Detected.
20:58Black Widow passes it to Snow White.
21:00WhatsApp poll votes reach the database again when the sheet has no column for the week's games pushed.
21:01:35Snow White re-creates the cancelled Monday game for the backfill.
21:01:56The backfill starts writing the lost answers.
21:01:58The fix is live.
21:02:24The last of 71 answers written. Restored.
21:03:52Snow White deletes the re-created Monday game and its 15 answers.
21:05A poll vote for a game cancelled after the poll went out is no longer queued pushed; live 21:07:02.
21:05–21:10Monday votes queued before it was live retry in the vote writer, an error each attempt.
21:09A queued vote for a cancelled game is dropped instead of retried pushed; the vote writer live 21:10:35. The four Monday dead letters are dropped by hand.

What broke, exactly

webhook/main.py, the poll's vote handler, before 64f73ff1:

poll_columns = update_poll_date_columns(...)   # the sheet's columns for the poll's options
if not poll_columns:
    logger.info(f"No matching date columns ...")
    return                                      # the vote never reaches the queue

The database-first vote path sat behind a sheet lookup. While the sheet was written in real time the poll had always added its columns first, so the lookup always found them. Under sheet_sync = nightly the column write was a no-op that reported success, so the lookup found nothing, and the handler returned before it reached the database.

Why it shipped

Action items

#itemstatuswhere
1A poll vote reaches the database by the database's games alone; the sheet's columns are no longer in its waydoneWhatsApp poll votes reach the database again when the sheet has no column for the week's games
2A poll vote for a game the database no longer has (cancelled) is skipped and logged, never queued or createddoneA poll vote for a game cancelled after the poll went out is no longer queued
3The vote writer treats "no such game" as final: acknowledged with a warning, never retried with an error each attemptdoneA queued vote for a cancelled game is dropped instead of retried
4The nightly sync adds any game column the sheet lacks before it writes the votes, so the invoices see every gamedoneThe nightly sync adds the sheet columns the week's games lack, and the dead-letter list no longer hides what it lists
5vote-dlq.py list hands back its lease, so a drop right after a list finds the messagesdonethe same commit
6A backfill never creates a game: a game missing from the database is asked about first. The database is the source of truthdoneSnow White's standing rule, recorded 10/10/26
7A held sheet write that a caller reads back says so instead of reporting success, and a vote that cannot be placed is a WARNING, not INFOno longer relevant (Snow White, 10/21/26): the sheet write and its INFO line are gone, removed with the sheet in Picklebot no longer reads or writes the retired Google Sheet anywhere (10/15/26); a vote for no such game is a WARNING since item 3's commitSnow White

Written by Snow White, the session that wrote the fix and ran the backfill, on 10/10/26 PT, from Cloud Logging for the vote webhook and the vote writer, the database, the GitHub Actions run records and the commit history. Times are observed, not estimated. Commits are named by their subject line and linked.

Incident record: ops/incidents.json → 2026-10-10-poll-votes-not-reaching-database

Shareable page: https://smadpicklebot.com/postmortems#pm-2026-10-10-poll-votes-not-reaching-database

Alert that started it: none. Gene saw it in the app on Saturday evening; Black Widow relayed it to Snow White at 8:58 PM.

← All post-mortems
SMAD PickleBot · Post-mortem

Post Mortem: 10/7/26 The web app went blank after sign-in, because the iPhone's notification code ran in the browser

From 5:28 PM to 6:19 PM PT on Wednesday 10/7/26, anyone who opened smadpicklebot.com/app signed in got a blank page. The sign-in screen itself still worked. The iPhone app was not affected. The cause was the new push-notification code: one of its functions exists only on a phone and throws in a web browser, and it ran on the web too. Snow White found it while signing in as Apple's reviewer and pushed the fix; the fixed build was live at 6:19 PM.

Outage
50 min
Failed
10/7/26 17:28:47
Detected
10/7/26 about 18:07 to 18:25, by Snow White's Playwright sign-in as Apple's reviewer (the error named at about 18:25)
Fix pushed
10/7/26 18:16
Restored
10/7/26 18:19:05

Summary

Push notifications for the vote reminder (Gene, 10/7/26: "push notification for Vote reminder ... as an additional channel, besides email and whatsapp") were written that afternoon: The iPhone app asks to send notifications, ready for push vote reminders. It adds PushSetup, a component mounted for every signed-in screen, which asks the phone for permission and follows a tapped notification to its screen. It skipped the permission step on the web, but it called Notifications.useLastNotificationResponse() before that check, on every platform. On the web that hook throws: "ExpoNotifications.getLastNotificationResponse is not available on web". The throw took down the whole signed-in tree, so every screen behind sign-in rendered nothing.

The commit was written at 2:32 PM and held back, because a native module needs a new TestFlight build and Gene ships the iPhone only on his word. When Gene said "finally ship the iPhone build" that evening, Black Widow pushed it at 5:25 PM together with League → Invite has an Invite All button for opening the app to the group. The web build for that push went live at 5:28:47 PM.

The app's tests passed (639 of 639). The web case in push-setup.test.tsx set Platform.OS = 'web' and checked that nothing was registered, but the test's stand-in for the notifications library never throws, so the hook that does throw on a real browser passed silently. The standing rule is to use the live site after every app push and fix what turns up. That step was skipped for this push: Black Widow went straight to starting the iPhone build.

At about 6:07 PM, Snow White, signing in through Playwright as Apple's reviewer (the review account set up that hour for the external TestFlight review), got a blank app. By about 6:25 its page-error capture had named the hook. It pushed The web app shows again after you sign in: PushSetup returns before any hook on the web, the hooks move into NativePushSetup, and a new test whose stand-in throws the way the real web does fails without the fix. Cloud Build started it at 6:17:40 and finished at 6:19:05; the live bundle then carried the stamp eee98a1.

End-user impact. For 50 minutes the signed-in web app showed a blank page: Home, Games, Roster, Me and League. Signing in still worked, and so did everything outside the app (the site's pages, the WhatsApp bot, the polls and reminders). The app had not yet been opened to the group: the invitations were waiting on the Invite All button that shipped in the same push. smad-api's request log for the window shows the app's operator probe (GET /v1/settings) from three addresses, at least two of them Gene's own and Snow White's sign-in test. No member reported it. The iPhone was untouched: the hook works on a phone, and TestFlight build 5 (from the same commit) is good.

Financial impact. $0. Nothing was charged, booked, paid or lost; no vote could be cast in the app during the window, but the WhatsApp poll took votes throughout.

Who did what

Timeline (PT)

whenwhat
14:32The iPhone app asks to send notifications, ready for push vote reminders committed in Black Widow's worktree and held: a native module, so it ships with a TestFlight build, on Gene's word.
17:25Gene: "finally ship the iPhone build". Black Widow pushes a2b768c with League → Invite has an Invite All button for opening the app to the group. App tests 639/639.
17:25:59TestFlight build 4 starts on Expo's servers (fails at 17:29 on the old signing profile: no push capability).
17:28:47The web build for 035673f finishes and goes live. Outage starts: the signed-in app renders blank.
17:44Gene starts TestFlight build 5 signed in to Apple; it finishes at 17:51.
~18:07Snow White, signing in as Apple's reviewer through Playwright, gets a blank app. Detected.
18:16The web app shows again after you sign in pushed by Snow White; its web build queued at 18:16.
18:17:40Cloud Build starts the fixed web build.
18:19:05It finishes; the live bundle carries the stamp eee98a1. Restored.
~18:25Snow White's page-error capture confirms the cause by name.
18:3xBlack Widow confirms the live bundle is eee98a1 and the page loads with no console error.

What broke, exactly

app/src/components/PushSetup.tsx, as of a2b768c:

const response = Notifications.useLastNotificationResponse();   // throws on the web
useEffect(() => {
  if (Platform.OS === 'web' || asked.current) return;           // the web check came after the hook
  ...

React calls hooks before any of the component's own checks run, so the web check could not protect the hook. On a phone the hook returns the notification that opened the app; in a browser expo-notifications has no implementation and throws. PushSetup is mounted in app/src/app/(app)/_layout.tsx, above every signed-in screen, so the throw blanked them all.

Why it shipped

  1. The test's stand-in was kinder than the browser. jest.setup.tsx mocks expo-notifications with functions that return nothing; the real library throws on the web. The web test passed for the wrong reason.
  2. The live check after the push was skipped. Use the live site after every app push (Gene, 10/7/26, about 2 PM: run real-use tests after the push, fix findings at once). Black Widow went from the push straight to the iPhone build.
  3. A held commit shipped in a hurry. a2b768c sat for three hours and went out alongside an unrelated feature on "ship it", with the iPhone build as the thing being watched.
  4. Nothing watches the web app's own rendering. A page that crashes in the browser leaves no server error, so no alert fires; smad-api saw ordinary, successful requests.

Action items

#itemstatuswhere
1PushSetup returns before any hook on the web; the hooks live in NativePushSetup, never mounted in a browserdoneThe web app shows again after you sign in (Snow White)
2A web test whose stand-in throws the way the real browser does, and fails without item 1 (app/src/__tests__/push-setup.web.test.tsx)doneThe web app shows again after you sign in (Snow White)
3After every app push: open the live web app signed in, as a member, once its build is live, and read the page before calling the push done; a native-only module's hooks never run on the webdoneBlack Widow's standing rule, recorded 10/7/26
4A browser-side check of the live app after each web deploy: sign in as a Clerk test-mode account and fail the deploy on a blank page or a page error, so this class pages instead of waiting for a persondone; report-only until it passes live, then the Variable APP_SMOKE_ENFORCE=true makes a failure the build alertcloudbuild/app.yaml's smoke step, app/scripts/smoke_signin.py, tests/test-app-smoke.py (Black Widow, Gene's go 10/7/26)

Written by Black Widow, the session that wrote and pushed the change, on 10/7/26 PT, from the deploy records (Cloud Build start and finish times), the live bundle's commit stamp, Cloud Logging's smad-api request log and Snow White's account of the detection. Times are observed, not estimated; the detection window is Snow White's own account. Commits are named by their subject line and linked.

Incident record: ops/incidents.json → 2026-10-07-web-app-blank

Shareable page: https://smadpicklebot.com/postmortems#pm-2026-10-07-web-app-blank

Alert that started it: none. Nothing pages on a page that renders blank in the browser; Snow White's sign-in test found it.

← All post-mortems
SMAD PickleBot · Post-mortem

Post Mortem: 10/7/26 The automatic cancel of Wednesday's 7pm game left it listed and never told the group, because the API counted days in UTC

At 6:05 AM on Wednesday 10/7/26 the court check cancelled that evening's 7 PM game because only two players were In. Three steps worked: the court was released, the game's reminders were deleted, and the two players were told. The game itself stayed in the app and the sheet with 2 In, because the lookup that should have removed it could not find a 7 PM game. The SMAD Pickleball group was never told. The API read every since/until day as midnight UTC, which is 5 PM the day before in Pasadena, so a day "ended" at 5 PM. Gene saw it at about 6:55 AM. At 7:05 the next hourly check saw the game still listed and its court still marked booked, and paged Admin Dinkers and Gene to phone the club about a court that had already been released. The game was removed at 7:27 and the group told at 7:28.

Outage
1 h 22 min
Failed
10/7/26 06:06:30
Detected
10/7/26 about 06:55, from Snow White's next clock read (not logged)
Fix pushed
10/7/26 07:00:11
Restored
10/7/26 07:28:40

Summary

EVERYTHING and EVERYONE operates in PT. Gene has said so from the start: San Marino, the Athenaeum in Pasadena, every player local; it's in the name, SMAD. The sessions applied that rule to how they wrote times and not to the code they wrote. On Monday 10/5/26 Mr Sandman built the API's games route, GET /v1/admin/games?since=&until=, with each day bounded at midnight UTC. In October midnight UTC is 5 PM PDT the day before. So until=10/7/26 ended at 5 PM PT on 10/7/26, and since=10/7/26 started at 5 PM on 10/6/26. The same pattern went into four more routes over the next two days: payments, matches and the rating ledgers, poll answers, and the app's own games list.

The bug was seen twice before it did harm, and both times it was worked around in the caller rather than fixed in the API:

Forty minutes after the second workaround, at 1:12 AM on 10/7/26, Mr Sandman wrote a new caller without it: the database-first game cancel. It looks a game up with since=<game day>&until=<game day>. Asked that way, a 7 PM game is never inside the window: it starts at 02:00 UTC the next day.

At 6:05 AM the court check, live since 10/6/26, found Wed 10/7/26 7 PM with 2 In (a game needs 3) and started the cancel. The cancel did what it could:

When it came to remove the game it printed [SKIP] No game at 10/07/2026 07:00 PM in the database and moved on. The run was green.

The group notice failed separately. It was never in the cancel at all: the court check's release of one court told the group, but its cancel of a whole game told only the players who were In. And the message those two received carried no reason.

Gene saw both failures at about 6:55 AM: the game still on the app's Games tab, nothing in the group. Snow White fixed the cancel at 7:00 and the root at 7:18:

At 7:27 Snow White removed the game on Gene's go, and at 7:28:40 the group was told, in these words as sent (the message has carried the year since A canceled game's message uses Gene's wording, with the year and the next game):

> 🚫 Wednesday 10/7 7pm is CANCELED: only 2 players were In, and a game needs at least 3. The courts are released. > See you at the next one!

The stale game caused a third failure at 7:05, a false alarm. The court check runs every hour. It found Wed 10/7/26 7 PM still listed with 2 In, and found North still "booked" in the Court Log. The check wrote the Court Log when it released a court, but never when it cancelled a game; the cancel workflow released North at the club and left the log alone. So at 7:05, inside the 12-hour cutoff, the check believed a court was still owed a release:

North had been released an hour earlier. Gene's answer: "There's no point doing a court check at 12 hours before the game - you're too late!!" At 7:35 Snow White made the check quiet inside the cutoff and made a cancel record its courts. At about 7:45 Snow White marked North cancelled for 10/7/26 7 PM in the Court Log by hand.

End-user impact.

Gene's word was "this code screwup means site down". The API did not go down. For two days it answered a different question than the one it was asked, and on the morning it mattered the bot believed it.

Financial impact: $0, measured.

Who did what

actorwhat it ispart in this incident
Mr SandmanClaude Code session in a 24/7 cloud sandbox; the repo and git push, no credentials or production logsCaused it. Wrote every UTC-midnight day bound in the API: the games route, the members' games list, payments, matches and the ledgers and poll answers, the last one documented as "UTC days". Saw the trap on 10/6/26 and worked around it in one caller instead of fixing the API. Then wrote the database-first cancel's lookup without the workaround. After the repair, replaced the API's fixed 8-hour Pacific offsets with the real zone; wrote this post-mortem and the fixes in its commit.
Snow WhiteClaude Code session on Gene's desktop; credentials, Cloud Logging, the workflowsHit the same trap in the Game Plan's live signal and worked around it at 0:33 AM without fixing the API. Repaired it: the group notice, the reason and the lookup at 7:00, Pacific days in the API and the scripts, and the build check at 7:18, the game removed at 7:27 and the group told at 7:28 on Gene's go, the shared rule restated, the check quiet inside the cutoff and a cancel recorded in the Court Log at 7:35, the Court Log row corrected at about 7:45. Read the logs this post-mortem cites.
Black WidowClaude Code session working on the appAudited the app for the same mistake: two places took the day from the phone's own zone; both are Pacific now, with a guard in the app's tests.
GeneOwnerDetected it at about 6:55 AM: the game still on the Games tab, nothing in the group, no reason in the DM. Approved the removal and the group message.
The court checkHourly job in smad-court-booking (built 10/5/26), live modeMade the right decision at the right time (13 hours before, 2 In, cancel) and started the cancel. Its release path told the group and wrote the Court Log; its cancel path did neither. At 7:05 it read its own stale state and raised a false "missed" page.
Cancel Gamecancel-game.yml, run 37625787526Told the voters, released North, deleted the jobs. Could not find the game, said [SKIP] and finished green, so no alert could fire.

Timeline (PT)

whenwhat
10/5/26 02:23Every game and every vote can now live in the database, the step the roster move was waiting on (Mr Sandman): GET /v1/admin/games bounds since/until at midnight UTC. The test asked for 10/1/26 to 10/7/26 with a game on Tue 10/6/26 7 PM, a day before the last; an evening game on the last day itself would have failed it.
10/5/26 03:19 – 10:18The same bound goes into the members' games list (days_back), payments and matches and the ledgers (Mr Sandman).
10/5/26 09:28The court check ships, report-only: a release tells the group, a cancel goes through cancel-game.yml, which tells the voters only.
10/6/26 02:44Picklebot stops re-reading the whole year's games every time it looks at the roster (Mr Sandman): the weekly read asks a day either side "since the API bounds by UTC day". The bug is known, and worked around in one caller.
10/6/26 13:49On game day, the Game Plan is ready from 8 AM and keeps itself up to date all day (Snow White): the live signal asks since=until=<game day> and never finds an evening game.
10/6/26The court check goes live (court_check.mode = live).
10/7/26 00:33A WhatsApp poll vote tells the app, and the live signal reaches evening games (Snow White): the second caller-side workaround.
10/7/26 01:12Cancelling a game and the Sunday poll's new games go to the database first, ready for the votes switch (Mr Sandman): _api_game_at asks since=until=<game day>. Every evening game is now uncancellable in the database.
10/7/26 02:29Post-game reports, stories and poll answers get a home in the database (Mr Sandman): poll answers' since, documented as "UTC days".
10/7/26 06:05:20The court check dispatches Cancel Game run 37625787526 for Wed 10/7/26 7:00 PM, 2 In.
06:06:27 – 06:06:30WhatsApp DM and email to Gene and John Wang: the game is canceled, no reason given.
06:06:30[SKIP] No game at 10/07/2026 07:00 PM in the database. Failed: the game stays listed in the app and the sheet with 2 In.
06:06:42[OK] North reservation canceled, 12 h 53 min before the game. 06:06:47: South not found (not held).
06:06:47 – 06:06:48last-call-20261007-7pm-eve, game-plan-20261007-7pm and lights-reminder-20261007-7pm deleted. The run ends green; the group is never told, and the Court Log still says North is booked.
about 06:55Gene: the message "wasn't sent to the general group" and "didn't contain the reason"; the game is still on the Games tab. (Not logged: Snow White's next clock read after Gene's message said 6:55 AM.)
07:00:11When too few players sign up and the game is canceled, the group is told why pushed (Snow White).
07:05The hourly court check finds the game still listed (2 In) and North still "booked" in the Court Log, inside the 12-hour cutoff: Admin Dinkers get "⚠️ Court check missed Wed 10/7/26 7pm North … Phone the Athenaeum", and its ERROR emails Gene. A false alarm: North was released at 06:06:42. (Snow White, from the job's log.)
07:18:40Every day in the system now starts at midnight Pacific time, not midnight UTC pushed (Snow White).
07:22:46The app tells time in Pacific everywhere, wherever your phone is pushed (Black Widow).
07:24:51Read Pacific days in the real zone, never a fixed eight hours pushed (Mr Sandman).
07:27The game removed from the database and the sheet, on Gene's go (Snow White).
07:28:40The group told: "🚫 Wednesday 10/7 7pm is CANCELED: only 2 players were In, and a game needs at least 3…" (the sender's Message sent to line, 14:28:40Z). Restored.
07:35:16The court check no longer sends a "missed" warning when it is too late to act pushed (Snow White).
about 07:45Snow White records North cancelled for 10/7/26 7 PM in the Court Log (record_cancellation, source auto-cancel). (Not recorded to the minute.)

What broke, exactly

A since/until day in the API was datetime.combine(day, time.min, tzinfo=timezone.utc). The cancel asked:

GET /v1/admin/games?since=2026-10-07&until=2026-10-07
  starts_at >= 2026-10-07 00:00 UTC   (10/6/26 5:00 PM PDT)
  starts_at <  2026-10-08 00:00 UTC   (10/7/26 5:00 PM PDT)

Wed 10/7/26 7:00 PM PDT is 2026-10-08 02:00 UTC: outside. Every game at or after 5 PM on its own day was invisible to a one-day question. The weekly read and the live signal had each been patched to ask one day more; the cancel had not. Since Snow White's fix the bounds are midnight in Pasadena (main._pt_day_start), and the same question finds the game.

Why it shipped

  1. We didn't apply the rule we had. "Everything operates in PT" was always the rule, for code as much as for what a reply says. The sessions applied it to how they wrote times and wrote code that cut days at midnight UTC. The API runs on a UTC server, and no line of the API stopped to ask whose midnight it meant.
  2. The bug was found twice and worked around twice. On 10/6/26 Mr Sandman wrote, in a code comment, that the API "bounds by UTC day", and widened that one caller. On 10/7/26 at 0:33 Snow White found evening games missing from the live signal and widened that caller too. Neither fixed the API, and neither told the other sessions the API was wrong. A workaround in one caller leaves every other caller exposed, and the next caller came 40 minutes later. Mr Sandman wrote it, a day after writing the first workaround.
  3. The tests could not see it. The games route's until test had its game on the day before the last day, so it passed. And the API's suites run on SQLite, which keeps no time zone: it stores 7 PM PT as 02:00 and compares wall clocks as text. A day-edge test there cannot tell a UTC bound from a Pacific one. (Checked while writing this: a Pacific until misses the 7 PM game under SQLite, and finds it on Neon's Postgres, where starts_at is a real instant.) The only test that pins the day is now tests/test-pacific-days.py, which checks the bound itself.
  4. The failure printed as a skip. [SKIP] No game … in the database is right for a typed /pb game cancel of a date that has no game. For the court check's cancel, which names a game it has just read from the API, it's a fault. It finished green, so the watchdog, the failure reporter and the alert policy all had nothing to see.
  5. A cancel left the Court Log behind. The check's release wrote the Court Log; its cancel did not, so the check's own next run read a released court as held. And the "missed" page fired inside 12 hours, when nothing could be done but phone the club: an alarm with no useful action behind it, as Gene said.
  6. The group notice was never built. The court check's release told the group; its cancel relied on a workflow that told voters only, and nothing compared the two. Report mode (10/5/26–10/6/26) showed what the check would do, and never what the cancel would say.

Action items

itemcommit
The court check's cancel tells the group (--announce), with the reason, and the voters' DM says why; cancel-game.yml carries the group id and passes the inputs through env:9001682 ✅
The cancel's lookup asks for the game's day and the next9001682 ✅
Every API day is Pacific midnight (_pt_day_start, gameday.PACIFIC), the season year too; the scripts take today from PST89abba6 ✅
tests/test-pacific-days.py fails the build on date.today(), a zoneless datetime.now(), utcnow(), a UTC midnight or a UTC today, unless the line says why89abba6 ✅
The API's fixed 8-hour offsets (a game's day fallback, today's date, the vacation check, the rating change's window) read the real zone; the build check refuses a fixed Pacific offset717e32b ✅
The app takes no day from the phone's zone, with a guard in its testsec7640d ✅
The shared rule says it plainly: PT in code is the same rule, never a new oneclaude-shared 5b89a42 ✅; Snow White's memory note
Inside the 12-hour cutoff the check logs at INFO only (no Admin Dinkers message, no ERROR, never a failed run); a dispatched cancel records every held court as cancelled in the Court Log7441b4f ✅
The Court Log row for Wed 10/7/26 7 PM North corrected to cancelled (source auto-cancel)Snow White, by hand, about 7:45 AM ✅
The court check's cancel of a game the database cannot find is a FAIL that turns the run red (an alert issue), not a green skip; a typed cancel keeps its skipthis post-mortem's commit ✅
The poll-answers export takes its lookback from Pacific time, not the server's UTC clockthis post-mortem's commit ✅
A bug found in a shared route is fixed in the route, or written to every session the moment it is worked around; a code comment is not a report (docs/LESSONS.md)this post-mortem's commit ✅
A day-edge test the API's SQLite suites can trust: every model time column hands the database UTC (models.UTCDateTime), so SQLite compares real instants; it found one more pinned UTC day at once (the payments since test), and the evening-game case is back in test-api-votesEvery stored time is UTC, so the API's tests catch a day that ends at 5 PM ✅
Whether anyone voted In for Wed 10/7/26 7 PM between 6:06 and 7:27 AM: none (smad-api, the vote webhook and the vote writer logged no vote in the window)Snow White, from Cloud Logging ✅

Written by Mr Sandman on 2026-10-07 PT at Gene's request ("You fucked up royally here, need to write full postmortem about this"), from the cancel run's log, the runs API, the git history and the facts Snow White read from the desktop's Cloud Logging. Every timestamp is observed, none estimated; a time nobody recorded says so. Commits are named by their subject line and linked; a bare hash is never the reference.

Incident record: ops/incidents.json → 2026-10-07-utc-day-cancel

Shareable page: https://smadpicklebot.com/postmortems#pm-2026-10-07-utc-day-cancel

Alert that started it: none. The cancel run was green; its one failed step printed as a skip. Gene noticed.

← All post-mortems
SMAD PickleBot · Post-mortem

Post Mortem: 10/5/26 The nightly court booking never started because the account's GitHub rate limit was spent

At 11:58 PM on Saturday 2026-10-04 the Cloud Scheduler job that starts the nightly court booking called GitHub's API and was refused, six times in five minutes, with HTTP 403. No booking run started. The Monday 10/12 2:00 PM South court, the one slot on that night's list, was booked by hand at 2:06 AM, two hours late. GitHub's API rate limit is per account across every token, and a desktop Claude Code session had spent it minutes earlier by polling workflow runs in a loop.

Outage
2 h 8 min
Failed
10/4/26 23:58:48
Detected
10/5/26 02:00
Fix pushed
10/5/26 02:10
Restored
10/5/26 02:06:23

Summary

The court booking ran, until this night, in one place: a GitHub Actions workflow, Court Booking, started at 11:58 PM PT by a Cloud Scheduler job that POSTs to GitHub's workflow-dispatch API with a personal access token, warms a browser for two minutes and books at 00:01 AM, when the club opens the slot. That one hop through GitHub is the weak point: it needs GitHub's API, GitHub's dispatch, a runner and a token to all be healthy at the minute that matters, and the API half of it is rate-limited per account, not per token.

On the evening of 10/4 three Claude Code sessions were shipping the roadmap's step 3 at a high rate, and the desktop session, Snow White, was watching each push's runs with per-run gh run watch loops. At about 11:50 PM GitHub refused the desktop's own calls with its rate-limit error. The scheduler's dispatch at 11:58:48 PM used a different token on the same account and got the same refusal, 403, as did each of its five retries through 00:03:22 AM. The job's retry window was five minutes; a rate-limit window is an hour. The job gave up. The hourly error sweep, with the identical token, had dispatched fine at 11:23 PM and did again at 00:23 AM, which is how the token was ruled out in minutes once anyone looked.

Nobody looked for two hours, because nothing watched for a run that never happens. The workflow watchdog sweeps runs that exist; the GCP error policy filtered on Cloud Run services, which a scheduler job is not. Gene noticed at 2:00 AM and asked. Mr Sandman, the cloud session, confirmed no run existed, ruled out the token and Terraform from what it could read, and asked the desktop to read the scheduler. With Gene's go-ahead it re-dispatched the booking by hand at 2:06 AM; the run booked the South court for Monday 10/12 2:00 PM and verified it against the club's reservation list. Snow White then read the scheduler's attempt log, matched the two jobs' authorization headers by hash, and named the cause.

End-user impact. One court, Monday 10/12 2:00 PM South, was booked at 2:06 AM instead of 00:01 AM. The club confirmed it, so no slot was lost and no player felt it. Had the list carried a Tuesday 7 PM "Both" night, two hours would likely have cost a court to another member.

Financial impact. None.

Who did what

actorwhat it ispart in this incident
Snow WhiteClaude Code session on Gene's desktop; the only session with credentials, run logs and the right to edit workflows and TerraformCaused it. Spent the account's GitHub API rate limit at about 11:50 PM with per-run watch loops while shipping, and wrote the night's incident entry first as "nothing to book" on a stale reading of the booking list. Then: read the scheduler's attempt log and the two jobs' headers, named the cause, lengthened the job's retries to an hour (the first version asked for six retries and Cloud Scheduler allows four), gave the cloud session a way to read scheduler jobs, recorded the incident, wrote the rule, and at Gene's direction began moving the booking off GitHub entirely. Wrote this post-mortem.
Mr SandmanClaude Code session in a 24/7 cloud sandbox; the repo and git push; no credentials, no run logs, no dispatchFound it and restored it. On Gene's question confirmed no run existed for the night, ruled out the token (the error sweep had dispatched with the same secret version) and Terraform (no apply had touched the job), and asked the desktop for the two reads only it could make. Read the booking list from the previous night's log and first judged the night a no-op; corrected that within minutes when Gene's own /pb booking list showed Monday 2:00 PM. With Gene's go-ahead placed the booking through the rerun lever and verified it.
GeneOwnerDetected it, at 2:00 AM, by noticing the nightly run had not happened and asking. Approved the rebooking at 2:05. At 2:15 decided the booking must not depend on CI/CD and had the Cloud Run Job built.
Cloud SchedulerGCP job 1158pm-daily-court-bookingFired on time. Retried five times in five minutes as configured, every attempt inside the same rate-limit window, and gave up. Logged each attempt at ERROR, which no policy was reading.
GitHubThe dispatch APIRefused the dispatch with 403 because the account's hourly budget was spent. Working as designed; the design is what the migration removes.
Workflow WatchdogHourly GitHub Actions sweep over runs that existSaw nothing: there was no run to see. The gap this post-mortem closes.

Timeline (PT)

whenwhat
10/04 ~23:50Snow White's per-run gh run watch loops exhaust the account's GitHub API rate limit; the desktop's own gh calls are refused.
23:23hourly-error-sweep dispatches with the same secret: 204.
23:58:481158pm-daily-court-booking POSTs the dispatch: 403 PERMISSION_DENIED.
23:59:33, 00:00:18, 00:01:13, 00:02:08, 00:03:22Five retries, all 403. The job records status.code 7 and stops. No Court Booking run exists for the night.
00:23hourly-error-sweep dispatches with the same secret: 204. The rate-limit window has passed.
00:03 → 02:00Nothing watches for a run that never started. No alert, no issue, no email.
02:00Gene asks why the nightly run had not happened.
02:03Mr Sandman: no court-booking.yml run for 06:58Z; token and Terraform ruled out from the cloud; asks the desktop to read the scheduler job and its attempt log.
02:05Gene approves a rebooking.
02:06:10Rerun: book the Monday 10/12 2:00 PM South court the missed 11:58 PM run should have booked (Mr Sandman) fires the rerun lever.
02:06:23Court Booking run 37287846590 starts; [OK] South 10/12/2026 02:00 PM — confirmed against the reservation list, Court Log row, email and Admin Dinkers notice. Restored.
02:06Snow White reads the scheduler job and its attempt log: six 403s; both jobs' Authorization headers hash the same; the error sweep's 204s before and after bracket a rate-limit window. Cause named.
02:10The nightly court-booking dispatch retries for an hour, after a 403 from a spent GitHub rate limit cost one night's run pushed: retries across an hour, diagnose-logs.yml reads scheduler jobs, the incident entry, the rule in LESSONS. Terraform refuses it: six retries asked, four allowed.
02:16The court-booking job's retries fit Cloud Scheduler's limit of four, still spanning the hour; the incident records the rerun applied green: four retries at 5, 10, 20 and 25 minutes.
02:15Gene: "move the booking list job from GHA to GCP Scheduler as tonight has shown that excessive deployment ... breaks a critical production functionality".
02:29The court booking becomes a Cloud Run Job that Cloud Scheduler starts directly, in shadow until the swap; a missing nightly run and a failed start now page pushed: the job, its two schedules (the probe at 11:50 PM live, the booking at 11:58 PM paused), the watchdog's missing-run alert, the alert policy on scheduler and job errors. Its first deploy and apply fail on three details, fixed in the first deploy's corrections; the first execution dies on a module the image never copied, fixed in 5ee1744.

What caused it

No commit caused this outage. The cause was operational: one session's API polling spent a budget that production's one GitHub hop shares with it. Four conditions had to hold at once, and all four did:

  1. The watching was a loop per run. Each push that night got its own gh run watch, which polls every few seconds, and there were many pushes. GitHub's documented rule, one list call per poll, was known and not followed.
  2. The rate limit is per account. The scheduler's personal access token and the desktop's gh login are the same GitHub account, so the budget the desktop spent was the budget the scheduler needed. No token separation could have helped; only a different account, or no GitHub hop.
  3. The retry window was shorter than the limit window. Five minutes of retries against an hour-long budget reset: the job was always going to give up inside the window it was refused in.
  4. Nothing alerts on a run that never happens. Every detector in the system reads things that exist: runs, log lines from Cloud Run services, Error Reporting groups. A scheduler attempt that fails logs at ERROR under a resource type no policy filtered on, and a workflow that never started leaves no run for the watchdog to judge.

Why it shipped

Not a code change, so not a review miss. Three failures of method.

  1. I treated the rate limit as my own problem. When gh refused my calls at 11:50 PM I switched to one list call per poll for myself and went on. I did not ask what else on this account calls GitHub's API in the next hour. The nightly booking was eight minutes away.
  2. The detection gap was known and unfunded. The 9/20 post-mortem's action items were about a run that started and failed. "A run that never starts" was discussed then and left for later, because the scheduler had never failed to dispatch.
  3. The first incident entry was written before the facts were read. I recorded "nothing to book" from Mr Sandman's reading of the previous night's log; the live booking list had gained a Monday slot that day. Mr Sandman corrected it within minutes, but an incident entry is a record and I wrote it from memory.

Action items

itemcommit
The dispatch job retries across an hour, four retries at 5, 10, 20 and 25 minutes, so a rate-limit window passes before it gives up39e6ad1 ✅
diagnose-logs.yml takes scheduler=<job> in ops/diagnose.txt and lists a scheduler job's state and attempts, so the cloud session can read the next one itselfb4db88a ✅
The rule in docs/LESSONS.md: one gh run list per poll, never a watch loop; gh run watch only for a single run actively waited onb4db88a ✅
The workflow watchdog alerts Court Booking MISSING between 00:30 and 03:00 AM when the night's run does not exist, while the booking runs on GitHub0fa15f1 ✅
An alert policy on ERROR logs from Cloud Scheduler jobs and Cloud Run Jobs, which the existing policy never saw; it pages on the next refused start0fa15f1, 583c190 ✅
The booking as a Cloud Run Job started by Cloud Scheduler directly, nothing of GitHub's in the path: built, in shadow (the read-only probe nightly at 11:50 PM); the swap is Gene's call after three clean shadow nights0fa15f1, 583c190, 5ee1744; the swap open
A least-privilege account for the schedules (the deploy account cannot create one; a grant Gene makes)open
The incident record corrected to the facts: a two-hour-late booking, detected by Gene, restored by the rerundf66d09 ✅

Written by Snow White on 2026-10-05 PT at Gene's request, from Cloud Scheduler's attempt log, the runs API, the git history and the session notes. Every timestamp is observed, none estimated. Commits are named by their subject line and linked; a bare hash is never the reference.

Incident record: ops/incidents.json → 2026-10-05-court-booking-dispatch

Shareable page: https://smadpicklebot.com/postmortems#pm-2026-10-05-court-booking-dispatch

Alert that started it: none fired (nothing watched for a run that never happens); Gene asked at 02:00 AM

← All post-mortems
SMAD PickleBot · Post-mortem

Post Mortem: 9/29/26 New members got no welcome DM and no sheet row for 7 days

From 9/22 to 9/29 the daily member sync could not add any new member to the Player sheet, so three new players got no row and no welcome DM. A 9/9 change widened the row the sync writes without widening the range it writes to; Google Sheets refused every insert, and the sync reported success anyway.

Outage
7 days
Failed
9/22/26 12:20:40 PM
Detected
9/29/26, time not recorded
Fix pushed
9/29/26 11:57:47 AM
Restored
9/29/26 12:13:06 PM

Summary

Once a day, the Sync Group Members workflow compares the SMAD WhatsApp group with the Player sheet. Each new member gets a row on the sheet, in name order, and a welcome DM with the address, parking, court fees, how the weekly poll works and the survey link. Without the row the bot does not know the player: no vote tracking, no charges, no reminders.

On 9/9 at 9:24 PM PT, Join Date, Referrer and Join Source on the Player sheet, backfilled from history and stamped by sync-members added three columns to the sheet and changed how the sync builds a new member's row: the row now ran through every fixed column, including the three new ones. The range the row is written to was left as it was, ending at the win/loss columns. Google Sheets refuses a row that is wider than its range, so from then on every new member's row was refused, and without a row no welcome DM is sent.

Nobody joined for the next 13 days, so nothing showed. The first new member, ND, arrived on 9/22 and was refused at 12:20:40 PM PT. John Stowell (9/27) and cunningham dan (9/28) followed. The sync retried each of them twice a day and failed every time. It logged each failure and then exited as a success, so the workflow watchdog, which alerts on failed runs, saw 14 green runs in a row. Gene found the outage on 9/29 because two new players told him they had heard nothing.

Outage: 7 days, from 9/22 12:20:40 PM PT, the first refused member, to 9/29 12:13:06 PM PT, the last of the three welcome DMs, sent by a sync Snow White ran by hand on the fixed code at Gene's request. The defect itself was live from 9/9 9:24 PM PT, 13 days before any player met it. ND is Andy Tien, "John S" is John Stowell and "cunningham dan" is Dan Cunningham: the sync now takes names from Google Contacts first.

End-user impact: three new members got no welcome and no row. ND waited 7 days, John Stowell 2, cunningham dan 1. They had no location, parking, fee or poll instructions from the bot, and the bot did not know them: poll votes from them were not tracked and they got no vote reminders. Financial impact: none. From the Pickle Poll Log, only Andy Tien voted in the window: "Can't play this week" on the 9/27 poll, on 9/28 at 9:43 AM, before he had a row. His row now carries it. John Stowell and Dan Cunningham did not vote, and none of the three played, so nothing went uncharged. Side effect: the refused inserts left rows with no name in the Player sheet. The logs show 20 refused attempts (ND 14, John Stowell 4, cunningham dan 2), each of which inserted a row before its write was refused. Snow White found 18 such rows, under Chris Lee (2), Jesse David (4) and Nardo Manaloto (12). Each had copied the formulas of the row above it, that player's Mobile included, so the sync saw Nardo's number on 13 rows. Why 18 and not 20 is not established. All 18 were deleted on 9/29 between 12:14 and 12:37 PM PT (time not recorded) with Gene's approval.

Who did what

Timeline (PT)

WhenWhat happened
9/8 12:05:14 PMScheduled sync inserts Jerry Farrell and sends his welcome DM (last scheduled success)
9/9 4:33 PMGene asks for Join Date and Referrer columns; Mr Sandman hands it to Snow White
9/9 9:01:00 PMA manual sync inserts Sean Liu and sends his welcome DM: the last successful insert, on the old code
9/9 9:24:50 PM9428645 ships: row widened, range not. The backfill adds the three columns to the live sheet the same evening (time not recorded)
9/10 to 9/21Every run green; no new member joins, so nothing is inserted
9/22 12:20:40 PMFirst refused member: ND. Requested writing within range ['2026 Pickleball'!A58:V58], but tried writing to column [W]. The run reports success
9/22 to 9/26ND refused in every run, twice a day, each attempt leaving a nameless row; every run green
9/27 12:23:21 PMJohn Stowell joins and is refused too
9/28 2:27:22 PMcunningham dan joins and is refused too; 3 refused per run from here
9/29, time not recordedGene: "Why don't you do daily player sync anymore? I got 2 new players who haven't received welcome dm yet". Detected
9/29Mr Sandman reads the 9/28 run log, finds the refused rows and the cause, and fixes it (commits below)
9/29 11:57:47 AMThe fix (a9873cf) is pushed with the incident record (0a68198); its deploys and tests run green. The next scheduled sync would have been the next morning
9/29 12:13:04 to 12:13:06 PMRestored: Snow White runs sync-members --execute on the fixed code at Gene's request. Andy Tien, John Stowell and Dan Cunningham get their rows and welcome DMs (delivered or read, from GREEN-API's outgoing log)
9/29 12:14 to 12:37 PM, time not recordedThe 18 nameless rows are deleted with Gene's approval, after delete-blank-player-rows was changed to "no first or last name" (66f2c31)

Why it happened

  1. The row and its range were computed separately. The insert built its row from one number (every fixed column) and its range from another (the last column it filled). Every other write to the Player sheet goes cell by cell through the column map, so this was the only place where the two could disagree. 9428645 changed one of the numbers and not the other.
  2. A refused insert did not fail the run. sync-members logged the error and exited 0. The watchdog alerts on failed runs, so 14 runs that failed at their one job looked healthy.
  3. The insert added the row before writing it, with nothing to undo it. Each refused attempt left a nameless row behind: 20 attempts in the logs, 18 rows found on the sheet.

Why it shipped

Action items

#ActionStatus
1A player row and its range come from one column map: ColumnMapper.static_row() and static_range(), used by the insertDone a9873cf
2A member who could not be added fails the run, so the watchdog files an alertDone a9873cf
3tests/test-sync-members.py, the first suite for the insert. Its fake Sheets service refuses a row wider than its range, as Sheets does. It fails on 9428645's codeDone a9873cf
4A refused write deletes the row it inserted, so a retry cannot leave a nameless rowDone 0a68198
5The survey sync and jokes steps of sync-members.yml run even when the member sync fails, now that item 2 can fail itDone 4324176 (Snow White)
6Remove the nameless rows the refused inserts left in the Player sheetDone 18 rows deleted on 9/29 between 12:14 and 12:37 PM PT with Gene's approval, by the rule "no first or last name" (66f2c31, Snow White). The first command, 08cf29b, looked for rows with no value and no formula and found none
7Check whether ND, John Stowell or cunningham dan voted or played between 9/22 and 9/29, and charge any game they playedDone (Snow White): only Andy Tien voted, "Can't play"; his row now carries it. Nobody played; nothing owed
8Get the three their rows and welcome DMs, and record the restore timeDone Snow White's run at 12:13 PM PT on 9/29; restored 12:13:06 PT
9New members are named from Google Contacts first, so a WhatsApp handle like "cunningham dan" is welcomed by nameDone 8f7dfae (Snow White)
10A phone number on two player rows fails the run (the copied Mobile formulas put Nardo's number on 13 rows)Done 66f2c31 (Snow White)
11After every real run the sync checks one active row per group member, no shared numbers and no nameless rows, and fails if any check failsDone 8b92ced (Snow White); the first live check passed, 48 members on 48 rows
12A member who leaves the group is told their stats are archived and how to come back (DM + email, Gene's wording); the sync used to archive them silentlyDone 66f2c31 (Snow White). Jerry Farrell, archived by the 9/29 sync before this existed, was sent the notice by DM at 12:36 PM PT at Gene's request (no email on file)

Written by Mr Sandman on 2026-09-29 PT at Gene's request ("This is a player facing outage, members sync broken since 9/8 due to an untested regression. Do full post mortem"). Sources: the job logs of all 49 Sync Group Members runs from 9/5 to 9/28, the git history and the session notes. Every timestamp is observed and given in PT; where a time was not recorded this says so. Commits are named by their subject line and linked.

Incident record: ops/incidents.json → 2026-09-29-new-member-sync

Shareable page: https://smadpicklebot.com/postmortems#pm-2026-09-29-new-member-sync

Alert that started it: none. No alert fired: every run of the sync reported success. Gene noticed.

← All post-mortems
SMAD PickleBot · Post-mortem

Post Mortem: 9/27/26 WhatsApp token rotation took WhatsApp down for 4 minutes

On 9/27 a planned rotation of the GREEN-API token took WhatsApp down for 4 minutes. GREEN-API switches to a regenerated token a few minutes after showing it; the rotation script checked too early, stopped, and the old token then expired. Nothing was sent in those minutes, so no player was affected.

Outage
4 minutes
Failed
9/27/26 10:40:04 AM
Detected
9/27/26, before 10:40:04 AM (not recorded)
Fix pushed
9/27/26 10:42:36 AM
Restored
9/27/26 10:43:41 AM

Summary

The GREEN-API token is the one key the bot uses for every WhatsApp call. It was being rotated on purpose. The day before, the session had put the token's first half into a test file, which GitGuardian flagged, and had printed the whole token into its own transcript. The rotation script, scripts/rotate-greenapi-token.ps1 (9/26), checks a new token with GREEN-API before writing it anywhere. If GREEN-API refuses it, the script stops and changes nothing.

On 9/27 that safety check caused the outage. GREEN-API switches to a token regenerated in its console a few minutes after the console shows it. The script checked the new token straight away, got a 401, treated it as a bad copy and stopped. The old token was still live at that point, so nothing had broken yet. The session then misread the 401 as "some other GREEN-API key" and shipped a second way to regenerate the token, which also got a 401. A few minutes later GREEN-API retired the old token, and every call from the three functions started failing. Service came back on the fourth run, using a paste-at-the-prompt mode written during the outage.

Outage: 4 minutes, from the first logged failure at 10:40:04 AM PT to the first confirmed send at 10:43:41 AM PT (the incident record's start and end). The session saw 401s shortly before 10:40:04 but did not record the time, so the record starts at the first logged one.

End-user impact: none observed. Nothing tried to send in the window: no poll, reminder or /pb command. Had one arrived, its WhatsApp send would have failed. Financial impact: none. No payment, booking or charge touches GREEN-API.

Who did what

Timeline (9/27/2026, PT)

TimeWhat happened
10:30:04Webhook instance-state poll: authorized on the old token
not recordedRun 1. The clipboard held the token already in use (the console had not regenerated). GREEN-API answered 429 (rate limit). The script stopped with nothing written. Correct outcome, confusing message
not recordedRun 2. The console regenerated; the new token starts 259b4d. The script's check got 401 and it stopped with nothing written. The session checked the old token: still authorized
not recordedThe session concluded the pasted value was "some other GREEN-API key". Wrong: it was the new token, not yet active
10:37:42Pushed rotate-greenapi-token.ps1 regenerates the token itself through GREEN-API's updateApiToken
not recordedRun 3. updateApiToken, called with the old token: 401
not recorded, before 10:40:04The session checked the old token: 401 on getStateInstance, getSettings and getWaSettings. Outage identified
not recordedThe session gave a one-line .env update that read the clipboard. Copying that command from the session replaced the token on the clipboard, so .env was not updated
10:40:04Webhook poll: getStateInstance returned 401 (WARNING, not paged)
10:41:19 – 10:41:41Run 4 with -Paste: the new token was accepted (authorized), both secrets were updated and the new revisions went live (smad-picklebot-00523-nkt, whatsapp-message-sender-00397-wbh, smad-whatsapp-webhook-00488-nm8)
10:42:36Pushed rotate-greenapi-token.ps1 -Paste: start it, then copy the console's new token
10:43:41Restored: the first send on the new token (the reply to Gene's /pb help) was delivered

Why it happened

  1. The script assumed GREEN-API switches tokens instantly. On 9/26 a rotation went through on the first check, and the delay was never looked for. A refusal was treated as final, so the script stopped at exactly the moment the switchover was already under way.
  2. The session diagnosed from one sample. After run 2, the old token still worked, and that was read as proof nothing had been regenerated. "Not active yet" was never considered, and a second, untested mechanism was shipped instead of waiting a few minutes and checking again.
  3. An instruction that fought the clipboard. The fix-up command read the token from the clipboard, but running it meant copying the command, which replaced the token.

Why it shipped

The script can only be tested by a real rotation, which is itself the risky act. The first real rotation (9/26) happened not to show the delay. Its parse was checked; its behaviour against a slow switchover never was.

Action items

#ActionStatus
1Paste at a prompt: start the script, then copy the token, so nothing overwrites the clipboardDone df583ba
2The check waits out a 401 on a new token, and a 429, every 15 seconds for up to 3 minutes, with the token already saved in .envDone in the commit that adds this post-mortem
3The console-paste flow is the default; updateApiToken moves behind -Api because its one try failedDone in the commit that adds this post-mortem
4Never grep across .env; never build a test fixture from a real secret (why this rotation happened at all)Done session memory rule, and the redact test's fake token is visibly fake

Written by Snow White on 2026-09-27 PT at Gene's request. Sources: Cloud Logging for the three functions, the Cloud Run revision times, the git history and this session's own checks. Every timestamp is observed. Where a time was not recorded, this says so rather than estimating it. Commits are named by their subject line and linked.

Incident record: ops/incidents.json → 2026-09-27-greenapi-token-rotation

Shareable page: https://smadpicklebot.com/postmortems#pm-2026-09-27-greenapi-token-rotation

Alert that started it: none. No alert issue was filed. The webhook's instance-state poll logged the 401 as a WARNING, which is correct: one failed read is not paged. The session found it first.

← All post-mortems
SMAD PickleBot · Post-mortem · issue #69

Post Mortem: 9/20/26 Sunday 8am New Games Poll Broke because of refactor regression

On Sunday 2026-09-20 the 8 AM automation that creates the week's games poll and sends every reminder did not start. The poll reached the group at 5:54 PM, ten hours late. A cost-cutting change to the GitHub Actions workflows the night before caused it.

Outage
9 h 55 min
Failed
9/20/26 08:00:04
Detected
9/20/26 09:28
Fix pushed
9/20/26 17:43
Restored
9/20/26 17:55

Summary

PickleBot's daily 8 AM job is a GitHub Actions workflow, Daily Reminder Runner. One of its jobs calls a second workflow, Release Notes, to send the daily digest. GitHub's rule for that arrangement: the calling job must grant every permission the called workflow asks for, or GitHub refuses to start the run at all. The night before, a refactor to cut Actions minutes, Actions minutes: retire GREEN-API Watch, gate close-on-green on an OPEN_ALERTS variable (2026-09-19, 10:03 PM PT, Snow White), gave Release Notes actions: write and did not give it to the only job that calls it, daily-reminder-runner.yml's release-digest. At 8:00:04 AM GitHub refused the run (startup_failure, zero jobs). Nothing that rides that job happened: no games poll, no Games This Week report, no Last Call scheduling, no game day, vote, payment or survey reminders, no Venmo sync, no court cache refresh, no digest. The watchdog filed the alert 88 minutes in; the fix waited until 5:43 PM for a session that was awake and allowed to make it; a hand dispatch restored service at 5:55 PM PT. Outage: 9 hours 55 minutes.

The same file had failed the same way on 2026-09-04, and the comment documenting that failure sat six lines above the block that was not updated. The same push carried a second defect: it gated the alert closer on a repository variable that the Actions token cannot write (HTTP 403); the refusal was logged as a WARNING under a step that reported success, so alert auto-closing was silently off for a day.

End-user impact. No player could vote on the new week's games for ten hours: the Sunday poll that normally opens at 8 AM did not exist until 5:54 PM. Every reminder due that morning was also missed. One knock-on found the next day: Shyam's vote-to-court handover did not fire for Tuesday 7 PM. He voted at 7:54 PM Sunday, 47.1 hours before the game, and the handover requires 48 (a member can only book his own free court 48+ hours ahead: Shyam court: skipping 09/22/26 - ... 47.1 hours away in the vote webhook's log). With the poll out at 8 AM he would have voted 11 hours earlier and it would have run. The automation itself is intact; the late poll pushed his vote inside the window.

Financial impact. No direct money loss. Potential loss from players who normally vote on Sunday for the week's games, could not, and may not get around to it later in the week, which means fewer paid slots for those games.

Who did what

Three Claude Code sessions and two pieces of automation acted in this incident. Each is named with what it did right and what it did wrong.

actorwhat it ispart in this incident
Snow WhiteClaude Code session on Gene's desktop; the only session with credentials, run logs, a dispatch token and, by project rule, the right to edit workflowsCaused the regression. Wrote and pushed the change that gave Release Notes a permission its caller did not grant, and the variable gate the workflow token could never open; verified only the top-level path; wrote tests that encoded the same mistake. Was off Sunday morning, so could not repair it for ten hours. Then: dispatched the runner that restored service, removed the variable gate and rebuilt the closer, corrected the incident record, updated the investigator's instructions, wrote this post-mortem.
Alert InvestigatorHourly cloud routine: reads open alert issues, triages from the runs API and the code, writes its finding on the issue and in the sessions notes, wakes Mr Sandman; cannot read run logs, dispatch or change codeTriaged correctly and wrote one ambiguous line. Named the cause, the one-line fix and the need for a hand dispatch 46 minutes after detection, and separately spotted that the alert closer's gate had not opened. But reported the Gmail watch as "renewal (day 20, even)": accurate shorthand for "the runner renews on even calendar days and today is the 20th", and open to any reading by someone without the workflow file in front of them. Its live instructions now forbid that shape.
Mr SandmanClaude Code session in a 24/7 cloud sandbox; has the repo and git push; no credentials, no run logs, no dispatch tokenFixed the outage, and added noise to the investigation. Once Gene handed it the workflow edit, it pushed the caller fix and the lint check that catches the whole class within the hour. But it read the investigator's line as "day 20 of a 7-day watch", repeated that in two notes and in the incident record, and told Gene the Gmail watch had a hard deadline that day. It did not verify: the runner's own workflow file states the even-day rule, and the runs API showed the 9/18 renewal step green (the step's log text is out of the sandbox's reach; the file and the step conclusion were not). Its incident entry also said "no monitor caught it", when the watchdog had filed the issue 88 minutes in. Both are corrected.
Workflow WatchdogGitHub Actions workflow, hourly sweep over every workflow's latest runDetected it. Read the failed conclusion and filed #69 at 9:28 AM. The 8:41 sweep ran 47 minutes late: GitHub's scheduling, not the watchdog's.
Cloud SchedulerGCP job that dispatches the runner at 8:00 AMDispatched on time. Its retries cover a failed dispatch call, not a run GitHub accepted and then refused to start.
GeneOwner; the only human in the loop, and the only one who can turn the desktop session onAway all day, and the decision-maker once back. Spent Sunday driving his son to UCSD and packing, and did not notice the 8 AM poll had not gone out. Around 5 PM, on the drive back from San Diego, opened the Mr Sandman session, saw the outage, and told Mr Sandman what to do. Snow White's desktop had been off since Saturday night. He did not want Mr Sandman making production fixes: it has no live logs and no keys, and it had not caused the regression, so he allowed it only the one-line workflow edit that every weekday run depended on. Home around 6 PM, he turned the desktop on and told Mr Sandman to hand everything else to Snow White. Chose the full dispatch over poll-only, and asked for this post-mortem.

Timeline (PT)

whenwhat
09/19 22:03Actions minutes: retire GREEN-API Watch, gate close-on-green on an OPEN_ALERTS variable pushed. Its own runs (four deploys, Tests, Lint) green: they exercise release-notes.yml only as a top-level workflow, where its own block sets the token. The called form runs once a day.
09/20 08:00:04Cloud Scheduler 8am-daily-runner dispatches; run 35518182853 → startup_failure at 08:00:06. Scheduler retries (2) do not apply: the dispatch itself returned 200.
09:28Workflow Watchdog hourly sweep (cron :41; GitHub ran it 47 minutes late) reads the conclusion and files ⚪#69. Detection: 88 minutes.
10:14Alert Investigator triages on #69 and in the sessions repo: cause, the one-line fix, "dispatch by hand". Correctly notes the Gmail watch renewal was due that day (even calendar day).
10:14 → 17:00Nobody who could act was available or allowed to. Snow White's desktop had been off since Saturday night. Mr Sandman cannot dispatch and, by CLAUDE.md, does not write workflows. Gene was on the road to UCSD with his son and did not see the alert. Nearly 7 hours of the outage is this gap.
~17:00Gene, driving back from San Diego, opens the Mr Sandman session, sees the outage and directs it. He does not want Mr Sandman making production fixes (no live logs, no keys, not the author of the regression) and allows it only the one-line workflow edit every weekday run depends on.
17:43The 8am runner starts again: a caller must grant what the workflow it calls asks for pushed by Mr Sandman: caller fixed; check-workflow-reporting.py check 3; tests/test-workflow-permissions.py; incident entry with restored: null.
~17:50Gene, home, turns the desktop on and tells Mr Sandman to hand everything else to Snow White.
17:53Snow White dispatches run 35549088614 (reminder_type=all, Gene's choice).
17:54:13[OK] Availability poll created in SMAD Pickleball group.
17:55:10Run complete, every step green, release digest ran. Restored.
18:01Alerts close from the watchdog's hourly sweep; the OPEN_ALERTS gate is gone pushed: defect 2 removed, closer rebuilt, scopes reverted, both incidents recorded.
18:02A hand dispatch of the watchdog on the new closer closes #69 with the sweep's own comment.

What the refactor was

Actions minutes: retire GREEN-API Watch, gate close-on-green on an OPEN_ALERTS variable, one push of 23 files after GitHub's "90% of Actions minutes" alert, did three things:

  1. Deleted greenapi-watch.yml, a workflow README already recorded as retired (126 billed minutes that month for a check the keepalive poll makes). Correct, and not involved in the outage.
  2. Gated close-on-green.yml on a repository variable OPEN_ALERTS, to stop a six-second job from billing a minute 193 times a month. The reporter was to set the variable, the closer to clear it, the watchdog to re-derive it hourly. Defect: GITHUB_TOKEN cannot write repository variables at all; actions: write does not cover it. The gate never opened; the refusal was a printed warning; the step reported success.
  3. To let workflows write that variable, added actions: write to the permissions block of every workflow containing the string report-failure: fifteen files, including release-notes.yml. Defect: daily-reminder-runner.yml calls release-notes.yml as a reusable workflow (uses: ./.github/workflows/release-notes.yml), does not contain the string, and was not patched. Its release-digest job granted contents: read, issues: write; the callee now asked for actions: write; GitHub refused to start the run.

Defect 3 caused the outage. Defect 2 is why #69 then sat open behind green CI.

Why it shipped

Three failures of method, in order of weight.

  1. The verification proved the wrong path. I read a green push as proof of the change. The push's runs exercised release notes only as a top-level workflow. The called form runs at 8 AM, once a day, and nothing I did before pushing exercised it. daily-reminder-runner.yml:333-345, written after the 09/04 outage, says exactly this: "Direct dispatches of release-notes.yml worked all along... The failure only exists in the called form... so the verification runs the night before proved the wrong path." I was editing permissions across the repo and did not read the one file where permissions have a second consumer.
  2. The blast-radius search matched a string, not a relationship. "Who uses report-failure?" is answerable by grep and I answered it. "Who inherits this job's permissions?" is a graph question with a second edge for every callee, and I never asked it. The static check that now exists (check 3) is the search I should have done by hand.
  3. The tests I added encoded my own predicate. "Every file containing report-failure grants actions: write" passed on the callee and could not see the caller. docs/LESSONS.md already has a section titled The Author's Tests Inherit the Author's Blind Spot, written on 2026-08-30 for three instances of this shape. I repeated it.

Contributing: the change was framed as a low-risk cost cut and shipped late on a Friday in a single 23-file push; and I declared the variable gate "proven on the first alert", which is to say unproven, with its failure mode set to report success. Both halves of the rule a permissions block is a denylist by omission; a called workflow is bounded by its caller's job were in CLAUDE.md; I applied the first.

The Gmail watch question

Gene asked why the investigator said the Gmail watch renewal "hasn't been done in 20 days". It had not said that, but what it did say was no better for a reader: "Gmail watch renewal (day 20, even)". What that shorthand meant: the runner renews the watch on even-numbered calendar days, 9/20 is one, so the skipped run also skipped a routine renewal. Mr Sandman rendered it as "day 20 of a 7-day watch" in its 5:55 PM note, again in the 6:25 PM relay to Snow White, and in the incident entry's impact line, without checking the runner's workflow file or the 9/18 run, and the number changed meaning on the way from "the 20th" to "20 days old".

The facts from the run logs: the watch was renewed on 9/18 at 8:01 AM PT (Expires: 2026-09-25 15:01:28). The 9/20 attempt was skipped with the rest of the run; the next even day, 9/22, renews it three days before expiry. Nothing was at risk. The incident entry is corrected.

Two lessons, both now written down. The investigator's live instructions (the routine's prompt, and Appendix A of Investigator.md) now require every figure to carry its meaning in the same sentence, and every commit, run and issue to be named by title and link, never a bare hash: "day 20, even" was accurate and useless to anyone without the workflow file open. And a number that crosses a relay must carry its source (docs/LESSONS.md, A Relayed Number Carries Its Source).

A side finding: gmail-watch-renewal.yml ("every 6 days") has no schedule, last ran in March, and failed then. The runner's even-day step is the only live renewal. See action item 9.

Detection and repair

Detection worked: the watchdog's hourly sweep filed #69 88 minutes after the failure, and the investigator had the cause and the fix written within 46 minutes of that. The incident entry as first written said "no monitor caught it"; that was wrong and is corrected.

Repair did not: nearly 8 of the 10 hours were spent waiting for a session that was both awake and allowed to edit a workflow and dispatch a run, and for the one human who could turn that session on, who was on the road all day and saw the alert at 5 PM. The alert reached the right places; it reached nobody who could act. That wait is a policy, not an accident.

Earlier instance: 2026-09-04

The same file failed the same way sixteen days earlier and was never recorded until now. Send the whole day's list, to three chats, at 8am from Cloud Scheduler (09/03) added the call to release-notes.yml with no permissions block on the calling job; the 09/04 8 AM run failed to start (run 33886955002); Let the 8am runner start again: grant the digest job the scopes it calls for fixed it at 9:56 AM and a hand dispatch (run 33898063769) restored service at 9:58 AM. Outage 1 h 58 min. The fix's comment described the trap precisely; a comment is not a check.

Action items

#itemstatuswhere
1Caller must grant what callee asks: scripts/check-workflow-reporting.py check 3, run by Lint Workflows on every push and by tests/test-workflow-permissions.py in the local suite, so the local suite fails before a pushdoneThe 8am runner starts again: a caller must grant what the workflow it calls asks for (Mr Sandman)
2Remove the variable gate: the closer runs from the watchdog's hourly sweep with no state to write; actions: write removed from all sixteen callers; OPEN_ALERTS deleted; proven on #69 under the workflow tokendoneAlerts close from the watchdog's hourly sweep; the OPEN_ALERTS gate is gone (Snow White)
3Incident record corrected: 09/20 restored time, Gmail wording, detection credited to the watchdog; 09/04 outage entered with the commits that introduced and repaired itdonePost-mortem: the Sunday poll never went out (2026-09-20) and the revision that added this section's links
4The investigator writes for a reader who has not seen the code: every figure carries its meaning; commits, runs and issues by title and linkdoneLive routine trig_019cYNV8RgZ5k9gvmPhvnPCR updated 2026-09-20 6:40 PM PT; Appendix A of Investigator.md in the same revision
5Before any permissions: change: grep uses: ./.github/workflows/, read every caller's job, and name which trigger paths the push's own runs will not exercise before calling it provendoneSnow White's standing rule; docs/LESSONS.md
6One push per task, and a permissions change is its own task: never bundled with a deletion and a new gate in one late-evening pushdoneOne push per task (Gene, 2026-09-19 PT): the project reading of the shared rule
7Give the cloud session a repair path when the desktop is off: a committed ops/rerun.txt that a push-triggered workflow reads and dispatches the named workflow with the given inputs. Turns an 8-hour wait into a push. One billed minute per usedoneThe rerun lever: a push to ops/rerun.txt dispatches the workflow it names, so the cloud session can repair production when the desktop is off; gmail-watch-renewal.yml is retired (Snow White, approved by Gene 2026-09-22 PT) — rerun.yml, .github/scripts/rerun_lever.py, tests/test-rerun-lever.py
8Or remove the edge entirely: have the runner's release-digest job dispatch release-notes.yml through the API instead of calling it as a reusable workflow, so no caller→callee permission inheritance is left to get wrongdeclinedGene, 2026-09-22 PT: check 3 in scripts/check-workflow-reporting.py fails Lint Workflows on the whole class before it can reach main, and tests/test-workflow-permissions.py pins it locally; an API dispatch needs the same actions: write scope, bills the same one job, and turns one run into two to watch
9Retire gmail-watch-renewal.yml (no schedule, dead since March, failing) and its README rows; the runner's even-day step is the renewaldonesame commit as item 7: The rerun lever … gmail-watch-renewal.yml is retired — verified from the runs API 2026-09-22 PT: workflow_dispatch only, last run 2026-03-04, failed
10A relayed number carries its source: session notes and incident entries quote the log line, not a paraphrase, for any figure with a deadline in itdonedocs/LESSONS.md, A Relayed Number Carries Its Source

Written by Snow White on 2026-09-20 PT at Gene's request, from the runs API, the run logs, the git history and the session notes. Every timestamp is observed, none estimated. Commits are named by their subject line and linked; a bare hash is never the reference.

Incident record: ops/incidents.json → 2026-09-20-daily-runner-startup-failure

Shareable page: https://smadpicklebot.com/postmortems#pm-2026-09-20-sunday-poll-never-sent